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In this thesis I try to develop a partial theory of normativity and justification. In the first part 
of the thesis I try to explore the possibility of what I call ’normative pluralism’, a position 
which holds that there exists a plurality of fundamental normative concepts. I argue that this 
plurality arises because all ought facts and reasons are necessarily relative to some normative 
standard, and there exists a plurality of these normative standards. Examples of such standards 
are morality and prudence, but there could be many more. Each of these standards is 
genuinely normative and consists of criteria that contribute to determine what one ought. 
These standards are also held to be incommensurable. Throughout the thesis I also argue 
against the common monistic view of normativity which holds that there is only one 
fundamental normative concept (usually the concept of ’ought-all-things-considered’). This 
view is represented by the writings of John Broome, Ralph Wedgwood, and Niko Kolodny. I 
argue that this view is forced to make some difficult trade-offs with regard to the question of 
what considerations are normative, and that it therefore has unintuitive consequences. Against 
the concern over how well the theory I defend would encompass practical reasoning, I try to 
work out an alternative conception of practical reasoning based on an account given by 
Joseph Raz. 
 
In the last part of the thesis I examine normative pluralism’s implications for justification. I 
argue that there are many types of justification, and that the standard of morality does not 
need some extramoral justification, as externalists about moral reasons believe. This means 
that moral norms are internally justified, and that the question of ‘why follow moral norms?’ 
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The topic of this thesis is the nature of normativity. In philosophy we often ask such questions 
as “why be moral?” or “why follow the law?”. These questions can be understood as a 
question of why endorse or comply with a particular set of norms. There is a certain way of 
answering these questions that is very common, which I believe to be wrong. This way of 
answering the question often has some peculiar implications that frequently go undetected. 
These implications usually only becomes apparent when we compare one of these questions 
with a similar question about a different set of norms. Morality and the law may be thought to 
conflict in some cases, and then we start to ask ourselves what we really ought to do. If the 
two systems of norms conflict, we often conclude that we ought not really to follow one of the 
two systems. Peculiar implications can then arise depending on the way we answer the 
question. These implications range from rejecting that we ought to follow the law, to a 
categorical rejection of egoist considerations, and even to amoralist skepticism. Common to 
these positions is that they all seem to deny a particular feature of our normative life. They all 
seem to relegate a particular aspect of our normative life to the domain of illusions. Some set 
of the norms we think we have are not real norms, we are often told. The end result can be 
seen as a very narrow conception of what counts as our real normative concerns. 
 
Another way of trying to solve the problem of conflicting norms involves an attempt to weigh 
the norms up against each other. We can then say that all normative concerns should be taken 
into account, but only one action – the most heavy-weighing – is actually required of us. 
There is only one thing we actually ought. If we take this position, the question arises as to 
how we are actually going to do the weighing. Can it at all be done? How do we weigh 
considerations that can seem fundamentally different? For instance, if we take morality to be 
about maximizing total welfare (utilitarianism), and take egoism to be about maximizing my 
own welfare, it isn’t at all clear what any weighing amounts to. It seems that if we are to reach 
a judgement about what weighs more in this case, then we have to take sides and reason either 
morally or egoistically. And if do take sides in this way, we may ask if we really have taken 




Problems arise, I believe, because the attempt to answer all these questions is made from a 
particular theory of normativity. Wrong answers appear because they rely on a wrong theory 
of normativity. 
 
This thesis will attempt to work out an alternative conception of normativity that can avoid 
these problems. The aim is to be able to provide a framework for answering questions about 
why follow this or that aspect of our normative life without at the same time denying other 
conflicting aspects of that same life. This alternative conception will avoid relegating a 
number of norms to the domain of illusions, and so it will be able to provide a much more 
charitable interpretation of our normative lives than the alternatives can.  
 
Although I shall call this alternative conception a theory of normativity, it is never the less not 
a complete theory of normativity. I will only focus on a particular aspect of normativity where 
I believe many philosophers have gone wrong. I will for instance not talk about how this 
alternative conception relates to the “natural” world. I shall assume that a complete theory of 
normativity is possible that is consistent with what I am going to propose. The alternative 
conception does for instance seem to imply a certain normative realism, so I shall assume that 




In the remainder of this chapter I will say a little bit about how theories concerning large 
philosophical problems (such as the nature of normativity) are to be justified. I will here try to 
shed some light on the methodology that I rely on, and what considerations there are that 
should make us accept a particular theory of normativity. 
 
Chapter 2 is the bulk of this thesis and is where I will attempt to construct, defend, and justify 
the theory of normativity that I will be advocating. I shall start the chapter by explaining the 
main concepts of the theory and show how they relate to each other. An outline of the theory 
is presented in 2.2. In 2.3 I shall consider some other rival conceptions of normativity and 
some objections that the authors of these conceptions direct against the theory that I will 
propose. I will try to show that these objections are ineffective, and I will also try to show 
some of the weaknesses of these other theories. These replies are made in 2.4. In 2.5, I will 
endeavour to give some further positive considerations in favour of the theory that I will 
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propose. The hope is that by first showing the weaknesses of the opposing views, these further 
considerations will provide additional support for the theory I am defending. 
 
Chapter 3 looks at the question of why follow norms, and takes up some problems about the 
topic of normative justification. This chapter only looks at the implications that the theory 
presented in chapter 2 will have for normative justification. It therefore relies on the 
discussion in the previous chapter. This does not mean that whether or not we should accept 
the claims in chapter 3 is all but dependent on how we evaluate the claims in chapter 2. 
Rather, the implications shown in chapter 3 are meant to lend further support to the theory in 
chapter 2. This last chapter shows the fruitfulness of the theory, by illustrating how we can 
reach sounder conclusions than through rival theories. This chapter will also provide some 
illumination on how to go about when doing moral philosophy. 
 
 
1.2 The Philosophy of Normativity: How to Solve the Big Questions 
The question of how to understand the nature of normativity is of course a large and complex 
philosophical issue, and even though I will only be concerned with a particular aspect of that 
nature, it is still a fundamental issue with far-reaching ramifications. Because of these 
ramifications the issue is entangled with many related questions that can constrain how we 
should understand the more basic concept of normativity. The issue in question can therefore 
be said to be situated in a complex web of interrelated questions. Moreover, the concept of 
normativity is so fundamental that the web promises to be of great extent. How then can we 
go about trying to theorize the issue and solving its problems? 
 
I shall follow Ralph Wedgwood in thinking that the sort of considerations that can speak in 
favour of a particular theory of normativity cannot amount to a proof 1. Rather, the only way 
of answering these larger questions of philosophy is trough some sort of inference to the best 
explanation. By showing that the theory can account for our intuitions, solves problems, has 
reasonable implications, and that it does so in a way better than its rival theories is the only 
plausible way to argue for a theory of normativity. Not every actual or potential rival theory 
can be examined here; nor can every intuition and implication be examined. Thus, all that we 
                                                 
1 Wedgwood, Ralph, The Nature of Normativity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 11-12. 
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can hope for is that the theory seems appealing and more advantageous than the theories that 
we compare it with. Wedgwood writes of his own work: 
 
I very much doubt whether anyone alive today is entitled to any great degree of confidence in the 
correctness of any theory that attempts to answer any of the larger questions of philosophy. Since the 
theory that I am advocating here is a theory that attempts to answer some of these larger questions, I 
doubt that I am entitled to much confidence in the correctness of this theory.2 
 
Although I think Wedgwood is a bit too modest here, we should at least keep in mind the 
complexities that arise from the interrelatedness of the theory with other issues. But although 
a proof does not seem possible, we should hope to find a theory that fits our intuitions in such 





I said that I shall argue for a theory by attempting to show that the theory in question can 
account for our intuitions, solve problems, and has reasonable implications (in a way that is 
better than rival theories). But how do we determine the reasonableness of implications, what 
counts as solving problems and accounting for intuitions? And how do we determine whether 
we do so in a better way than others? One tool that philosophers have always used is showing 
that the theory does not involve any logical contradictions. If one can at the same time show 
that the rival theory does involve contradictions, then the former theory is the better theory. 
But what happens if we cannot find any direct contradictions in the rival view, such that both 
theories appear equally consistent? Another tool that the philosopher can then use is to appeal 
to coherence by trying to show that the theory best coheres with other things we hold true. But 
again we ask the question of what counts as cohering. 
 
The tool that is in practice most important for the philosopher might reasonably be said to be 
charity. Not only is it useful, but it can also be argued to be necessary. Donald Davidson 
writes: 
 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p. 12. 
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Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them 
right in most matters. If we can produce a theory that reconciles charity and the formal conditions for a 
theory, we have done all that could be done to ensure communication. Nothing more is possible, and 
nothing more is needed.3 
 
Charity, counting others mostly right, serves as a constraint on theories and is very important 
(perhaps all-important) in how we evaluate a philosophical theory. Davidson says that “just as 
we must maximize agreement or risk not making sense of what the alien is talking about, so 
we must maximize the self-consistency we attribute to him, on pain of not understanding 
him”4. Understanding the world includes understanding other people, and in order to do that 
we must interpret them as being as rational as possible. Thoughts like this does seem to be 
more or less the received view in philosophy today, and it is something that I will both follow 
and that provides the most important motivation for endorsing the theory that I will propose. 
 
Taking charity to be the main guide in evaluating a theory’s adequacy, I will argue that the 
theory I shall propose offers a much more charitable interpretation of people than the rival 
theories I will consider. The problem with these theories is that they tend to conclude that 
some part of what seems to be normative language is not really normative after all. If we use 
it in a normative way, then we would be mistaken. But it seems to me that we do use it 
normatively. The normative domain is narrowed considerably down by the rival theories in a 
way that to me does not seem consistent with the way we speak and act. Some considerations 
which we often take to be reasons are held not to be reasons after all because they conflict 
with other reasons we think we have. The theory I will propose aims to accommodate all these 
considerations as real considerations, and so we will not be mistaken when we use them qua 
considerations in a justificatory enterprise.  
 
Furthermore, when we say that charity requires that we interpret people as mostly correct, that 
can also be said to involve interpreting them as acting correctly. Because the rival theories I 
will consider narrows down the normative domain, they cannot avoid attributing to people a 
significant degree of irrationality when they act from considerations that the theory holds not 
to be normative after all. For instance, when someone acts egoistically and at the same time 
                                                 
3 Davidson, Donald, ”On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, in Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 197. 
4 Davidson, Donald, ”Truth and Meaning”, in Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,  2001), p. 27. 
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immorally, then it might be said that the person is acting irrationally because we think that 
one ought to, and have reason to, act morally. The problem is that it seems that we can 
observe a relatively large degree of such behaviour, and we must therefore attribute a 
relatively large degree of irrationality to people. The problem becomes worse if we also 
assume that these people also know that the act in question is wrong. Then there is certainly 
irrationality in the picture, one could argue. Yet it doesn’t seem to me that this is the most 
charitable way to look at these things. There is a way that we can make sense of this kind of 
behaviour and avoid attributing to people all this irrationality, and this means denying the 
narrowing down of normativity that the rival theories argue for. At the same time we want to 
account for the intuition behind these rival theories; that this kind of behaviour is at the same 
time wrong. We shall seek a theory that holds both intuitions to be right while keeping away 
any logical paradox. 
 
All this is also connected to a way of doing philosophy that limits the way in which 
philosophers can claim to make discoveries that certain aspects of the world are illusory. 
Philosophy is more of an interpretative project than a quest to discover what is really real. 
What philosophy should be about is interpreting our language and beliefs in a charitable way, 
and that involves assuming that what we take to be true actually is true. This does not mean 
that we cannot, after due reflection, discover that we are mistaken about something, but we 
must start out by assuming people to be correct. Then we can see if we are able to salvage it 
all in the face of apparent contradictions we might encounter. We want to avoid the tendency 
to let a prior metaphysical conception of reality control one’s understanding of the issue that 
is facing us5. Although I shall start out by outlining a theory and argue from there, its 
justification can be found in the way it provides a charitable account of our normative lives.  
 
 
1.3 A Note on Schemata 
In the course of this thesis, I shall often refer to verbs and actions by using various schemata. 
The most common sign to signify verbs seem to be the Greek letter ϕ, and I shall mostly stick 
to this way of representing verbs and actions. However, not all of the writers that I shall 
discuss use this way of representation. For instance, John Broome uses F and Niko Kolodny 
uses X. When discussing these writers I shall mostly use the same schemata as they do, and so 
                                                 
5 See Stroud, Barry, The Quest for Reality, (New York : Oxford University Press,  2000), p. 211. 
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the sign that I use will vary between contexts. I hope that this will not cause any problems for 



































2.0 A Theory of Norms: Normative Pluralism 
 
 
In section 2, I will discuss the nature of norms and normativity, and I will try to develop a 
theory of norms. The theory and the issues I will discuss, are not in any way supposed to offer 
a complete account of the nature of norms and normativity. Rather, I wish to focus on one of 
their particular aspects. This aspect is whether or not norms are homogenous in kind, or 
whether they really are different in their nature. 
 
The theory which I will offer in 2.2, will understand norms not to be homogenous in their 
nature, but as being of different kinds. I will try to show that such a theory can be coherent, 
and I will show what needs to be assumed in order for this to be so. After I have offered this 
theory, I will in section 2.3 present the views of John Broome, Niko Kolodny, and Ralph 
Wedgwood. These three writers hold theories that are contrary to the one which I will offer, 
and they all argue against it. Section 2.4 will be concerned with showing that the arguments 
presented in 2.3 are ineffective, and that the theory is therefore not inconsistent. In 2.5 I will 
try to support my theory further by providing positive arguments in favour of it. In 2.6 I shall 
discuss some additional issues with the theory. I shall begin this section (in 2.1) however, by 
clarifying a bit about the concepts that are used in these discussions, and how I intend to use 
them.   
 
 
2.1 The Fundamental Normative Concept 
There have been various philosophical disagreements about what normativity refers to, and 
what makes some proposition a normative proposition. For instance, expressivists might say 
that the meaning of normative statements is given by the mental states or attitudes that the 
statements express6. I am not going to discuss expressivism in this thesis, and I shall take it as 
given that expressivism is false, but we should note that even expressivists identifies 
normative propositions by finding in them certain concepts. We identify the proposition 
“Smith ought not to kill Jones” by the occurrence of the term ‘ought’7. There might be other 
                                                 
6 Wedgwood, Ralph, The Nature of Normativity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 4. 
7 There are also non-normative uses of ’ought’ such as ’Pluto’s orbit ought to be elliptical’. See John Broome, 
Reasoning (unpublished manuscript, 2005 (?)), p. 9. This means that the occurrence of words such as ‘ought’ is 
not sufficient for the proposition to be normative. 
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such terms signifying normativity as well, such as ‘reason’, ‘good’ (or its antonym ‘bad’), 
‘obligation’, ‘requirement’ and perhaps others.  
 
Some have argued that not all of these are truly normative concepts. The proposition “Smith 
killing Jones would be bad”, would not be normative, but merely evaluative, some of these 
philosophers have said8. The term that has been used to mark a contrast with the ‘normative’ 
is that of ‘evaluative’. The thought here is something along the lines that the normative in 
some sense tell you what to do by giving you some sort of imperative. The evaluative fact that 
this apple is good to eat does not mean that you ought to eat it. You may have no reason at all 
to eat it. Perhaps you are extremely allergic to apples. If you are, the goodness of the apple 
does not bear in any way, it might be said, on whether or not you ought to eat it. On the other 
hand, it seems true that the goodness of something may provide you with a reason to do 
something, so perhaps goodness is normative in some way after all?  
 
It does seem clear that goodness is closely related to the normative in some way, but we 
should note that what seems to matter is whether this goodness has any bearing on what we 
ought or have reason to. Whether goodness matters depend on whether it is also a reason or an 
ought fact. This leads to the though that it is reasons and ought facts that are the fundamental 
normative concepts. In what follows, I shall assume that the above line of thought is correct: 
the concept of goodness (and badness) belongs not to the normative, but to the evaluative9. 
Our evaluative concepts are used not to generate imperatives, but are used in a classificatory 
way. In other words, the evaluative concepts does not tell us what to do, but merely designates 
things into the categories of good (or valuable) or bad. 
 
Yet while homing in on the fundamental normative concept, there is still a certain 
disagreement. Joseph Raz has claimed that “the normativity of all that is normative consists in 
the way it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons”10. This seems to amount to taking 
                                                 
8 As does John Broome: ”Many authors include the evaluative within the normative; I do not, so for me good is 
not a normative concept at all”. John Broome, op. cit., p. 8. 
9 Note that this assumption seems to be necessary if the distinction between normative pluralism and value 
pluralism is to make any sense. That these two pluralisms are independent of one another is witnessed by 
Thomson who argues that all goodness is good in a way (value pluralism), but that ‘ought’ has only one sense. 
See Thomson, Judith Jarvis, Goodness and Advice (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 44. 
We can also imagine someone holding a converse theory where there is only one kind of good, but many criteria 
telling us how we ought to realise or distribute that good.  
10 Joseph Raz, ”Explaining Normativity: On Rationality and the Justification of Reason”, in Engaging Reason, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 67. 
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the concept of a reason as the central normative concept. Philosophers such as John Broome 
do not agree with this. Broome believes that ‘ought’ is the central concept11. I shall not enter 
this discussion, because what I am going to say does not hinge on what concept is central. I 
can accommodate this indifference, because the theory I will offer is consistent with either 
view. 
 
Where I will differ with John Broome is on his claim that the concept of ‘ought all things 
considered’ is the central normative concept12. I do not think we can have such a concept in 
Broome’s sense of it. The reason why I think so, which will be made clear in 2.2, is that we 
actually have several fundamental normative concepts. I do not mean to argue that both ought 
facts and reasons and perhaps ‘requirements’ and ‘obligations’ are all fundamental. I think 
that there is probably some kind of hierarchical relationship between these concepts such that 
some of them explain the others, but this relationship is indifferent to me. What I will argue is 
that no matter which of these we take to explain the other concepts, that concept can itself be 
differentiated into several distinct concepts. Assume that ‘ought’ explains the concept of 
‘reason’. What I want to argue is that there are several types of this ought. If we assume 
‘reason’ to be central, then what I want to argue is that there are several types of reasons13. 
This means that even if one of these terms can be seen as conceptually privileged, that does 
not mean that this concept is itself homogenous14.  
 
In the rest of this thesis, I shall for the most part assume that oughts can be seen as 
conceptually central. This is just done in order to simplify, and I do not rely on it in any way. I 
could just as well have spoken about reasons in the same way, and sometimes I will. Although 
I mainly restrict myself to speaking about oughts, I will sometimes speak about reasons and 
even other normative concepts. I hope that this will not generate any confusion. Whenever 
you encounter one of these terms, you should have no problem with translating them into 
whatever normative concept you may think is central as long as that concept is truly 
normative and not simply evaluative. 
 
                                                 
11 John Broome, Reasoning, p. 8. 
12 See Broome, Reasoning, p. 20. 
13 Several writers (see for instance Raz, Joseph, Practical Reason and Norms, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999) have distinguished types of reasons through the logical form of the content reasons. As will become clear, 
this is not what I will be concerned with.  
14 If it is not homogenous, that does not mean that there would be additional problems with explaining the other 
normative concepts. All the supposed different types of oughts would all be oughts. They would all share some 
properties which could still make them conceptually privileged over that of a reason. 
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 2.2 Normative Pluralism: An Outline 
The theory that I will propose here is not something I have encountered in a developed form 
in any other philosophical writings. The theory holds that there is not just one, but several 
fundamental normative concepts. This theory could therefore be called normative pluralism. It 
can be contrasted with theories such as that of John Broome. Broome thinks that ‘ought all 
things considered’ is the only central normative concept, and that there are not several 
concepts, such as the moral ought and the rational ought. I believe that there are several such 
oughts, each of them truly normative in Broome’s sense. His position could be called 
normative monism. 
 
How would normative pluralism look like? This position holds that there exist several 
different oughts15, and it would even open the possibility that several such oughts could exist 
at the same time and recommend different, incompatible actions. Oughts, according to this 
theory, can be seen as always being relative to some normative standard. What standard a 
particular ought-statement is relative to is revealed by the adverb that is, or can be, attached to 
the ‘ought’. Thus, ‘legal ought’, ‘rational ought’, and ‘moral ought’ designate three different 
concepts. This is sometimes reflected in speech. In some cases we recognize that different 
standards require different things of us, and we say that while you ‘legally ought not to ϕ’, 
you never the less ‘morally ought to ϕ’. If all oughts are necessarily relative to such a 
standard, or necessarily modified by such an adverb, then it seems to follow that there is no 
ought simpliciter. There is no simple ‘ought’ that is not governed by a standard, or that can be 
detached from its adverb. There would just be these different relativized oughts. This is 
exactly what normative pluralism holds to be the case. There is nothing we ought pure and 
simple, but only things we ought relative to various standards. 
 
I will say a little bit about why think that there are several different oughts in the first place. 
One reason for this may be that when reasoning about how to act, one inevitably seems to 
evaluate one’s possible actions with reference to some standard. When thinking of how I 
ought to act, I think in terms of morality, rationality, or some other standard, and I try to make 
out what these standards would require of me. In some cases, these different standards will 
also require different and incompatible actions. For instance, the standard of correct reasoning 
                                                 
15 Or several distinct types of reasons. However, from now on I shall mainly restrict myself to using oughts.  
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may require you not to hold a contradictory belief, while morality may require doing just that 
because in some cases if you don’t, horrible consequences will follow. Another example 
would be that the law requires one thing of you, while morality requires the opposite. Or 
perhaps the legal requirement would not be “poetic” enough, in which case one could say that 
the legal standard requires something else than the aesthetic standard. When each standard 
yields different and incompatible requirements after proper practical reflection, we may come 
to suspect that there is more than one normative concept, and more than one ought. 
 
We have seen that the existence of various standards makes it possible that different and even 
incompatible actions may be required of you. What we need to realize is that on this theory, 
each of these standards are seen as genuinely normative. This means that each of them can 
impose normative imperatives on you, and that it would both be true, in some sense, that you 
ought to satisfy all of these imperatives, even if they require incompatible actions. If it is the 
case that morality demands that you ϕ, and it is the case that prudence demands that you not 
ϕ, then it is also the case that you ought to satisfy each. 
 
There is a dangerous pitfall here. In the last sentence of the previous section, I used the term 
‘ought’. According to the theory I am currently proposing, we can not really speak of such 
simple oughts. Every ought has its sense modified by some adverb. If we can understand the 
‘ought’ in this sentence as unqualified, then it seems like there exists an ought which is more 
fundamental than the adverbial oughts. So if we are to be consistent with normative pluralism, 
this means that the sentence in question should rather be understood in a more trivial fashion 
like the following: If it is the case that morality demands that you ϕ, and it is the case that 
prudence demands that you not ϕ, then it is also the case that you morally ought to ϕ, and it is 
the case that you prudentially ought to not ϕ. I do not think the triviality of this should be seen 
as discouraging. As Broome argues, our fundamental normative concept is a primitive 
concept. This means that it can’t be analysed. Still, he contends that “most people understand 
it well anyway, without analysis”16. I shall follow him in this. I also think that we have a basic 
understanding of what it means to say that you ought (in either of its many senses) something. 
 
In a certain way, speaking of simple oughts is not really very problematic, even for normative 
pluralism. Although the various adverbial oughts designate different concepts, it is still true 
                                                 
16 Broome, op. cit., p. 8. 
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that they all are oughts. They are different types of ought. But from the fact that we have this 
basic concept of an ought, it doesn’t follow that any of the various types of oughts can be 
detached from their adverbs. The reason I can say this is because normative pluralism is not a 
semantical theory, but an ontological theory. It holds that for every ought that exist, that 
ought is adverbially modified. Hence there is no ought simpliciter. The theory does not hold 
that we cannot make sense of an unqualified concept of ought.  
 
In fact, the theory may seem to need this concept to be coherent in order to at all be able to be 
clearly formulated. If we could not understand the simple concept of ought, then it is hard to 
see how we could understand its other senses – the senses which are results of the ought  
being modified by adverbs. Thus we can understand a concept of ‘ought’ which all of its types 
partake in. It is this concept which accounts for the normativity of the adverbial oughts. But 
that does not imply that the concept in fact refers to an ought simpliciter which can exist on its 
own.  
 
So normative pluralism holds that there exists several oughts and all oughts that exist are 
relative to a standard17. The fact that they are relative to standards, make them different types 
of ought, and the type is signified by an adverb. These claims account for the plurality part of 
the theory. It also holds that all these oughts are truly normative. They all make true practical 
demands upon us, which is to say that they tell us what we ought to do. This, of course, is the 




There is another aspect of the theory. This is the idea of incommensurability. The term 
incommensurability is usually taken to mean that there is no common measure for 
comparison. As I shall explain below, I think that the thesis of incommensurability is 
necessary for normative pluralism to hold. First however, I shall try to explain what 
phenomenon I take the concept to refer to. 
 
                                                 
17 This is not exactly true. It is not logically necessary for normative pluralism that oughts are seen as relative to 
standards. However, I think that this is a claim that has to hold for the theory to be plausible, and so I will treat it 
as an essential part of the theory. See section 2.2.2 for more on this. 
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The basic notion of incommensurability might be said to be that between incommensurates, 
that is, between incommensurable items, there is no common basis by which one can make 
comparative judgements. This is what I shall mean by the term. There are others who use the 
term differently, but I suspect that this is because they discuss it in the context of 
incommensurable values18. My business here is not with values, but with normative standards 
and requirements, and the oughts or reasons they generate. If oughts or reasons compare, they 
do so in a way different from values.  
 
There is a question whether incommensurability implies incomparability. Some authors, like 
Joseph Raz, uses the terms interchangeably19. If there is no common measure, it could seem 
as if there is no way for two items to compare. I do not think that there is such an entailment, 
however. What follows from the idea of incommensurability is that there is no common 
measure by which to compare them, no comprehensive way in which comparisons can be 
done. They could, however, be compared in different ways, which could possibly be 
described as idiosyncratic. Take normative standards and the question of whether or not to ϕ. 
Option A involves ϕ-ing, while option B involves not ϕ-ing. Suppose that ϕ-ing is 
prudentially required, but morally prohibited. It seems that we can perfectly well morally 
compare the two options A and B. According to the moral standard, option A outweighs 
option B. At the same time a prudential comparison would judge the opposite. What 
incommensurability means in this context then, is that there is no neutral way to make 
comparisons. They are all relative to a standard, and there is no one true way to compare20. 
This is what it means to say that there is no common measure. 
 
One way in which incommensurability has been characterized is through phenomena like 
‘trumping’21. A trumps B, James Griffin says, if any amount of A, no matter how small, is 
                                                 
18 Ruth Chang reserves the term for items that cannot be ranked in a precise manner. See Chang, Ruth, 
”Introduction” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Ed. Ruth Chang), (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Michael stocker reserves it for items that cannot be ranked cardinally. See 
Stocker, Michael, Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 176. While values can 
possibly be thought to be able to be cardinally ranked, the idea seems to make no sense to the notion of 
normative requirements. 
19 Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 322. 
20 This could be seen to be consistent with what Henry Richardson calls ’weak commensurability’ according to 
which in any given conflict there is a true ranking in terms of some value (or here normative standard). But his 
seems to me to be more a question of comparability than commensurability, and in any case it poses no problems 
for my position. See Richardson, Henry, Practical Reasoning About Final Ends, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 105. 
21 Griffin, James, Well-Being – Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), p. 83. 
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more valuable than any amount of B, no matter how large22. It is, however, seriously doubtful 
as to whether trumping implies incommensurability. It might even be thought that it is 
inconsistent with incommensurability given that they think incommensurability is 
synonymous with incomparability, for trumping clearly seems to imply that A and B can be 
compared. In this case, A is better than B. For this reason, it seems right to me to say that 
trumping does not imply incommensurability. Moral feature A could trump moral feature B, 
but here there would be a common measure, namely morality. On the other hand, normative 
pluralism can accommodate trumping, and might even imply trumping in another way. That 
one feature trumps another is not sufficient to establish incommensurability, but when two 
features, or in this case standards, are said to be incommensurable, then that could be taken to 
imply trumping. When there are two incommensurable standards, those two can each be said 
to trump each other. In the case above, prudence required ϕ-ing, while morality prohibited it. 
If both claims are true, and there is no common non-idiosyncratic measure by which to 
compare them, each can be said to involve trumping the other.  
 
All this can help us make sense of Joseph Raz’s characterization of incommensurability. Raz 
writes, in the context of values, that when two values are incommensurate, then neither of 
them is better than the other, nor are they of equal value23. In the current context this could 
mean that none of the requirements is more right than the other, nor are they equally right. Yet 
we should be careful in making such a statement. The reason why we should be careful is that 
according to a third standard, say the law, one of the requirements may be more right than the 
other. What we should rather say is that if two requirements are incommensurable, then there 
is no non-idiosyncratic way in which one of them is better than the other, or that they are of 
equal value. There is no super-standard or comparison simpliciter which takes precedence 
when we judge what we ought. By saying that we do not say that the standards are equally 
good, for that judgement presupposes a common non-idiosyncratic measure by which to 
compare them. We could however accept that they are equally good in an idiosyncratic way. 
 
By now, it should start to become clear why incommensurability is essential to normative 
pluralism. Incommensurability denies that there is one comprehensive non-idiosyncratic 
standard by which we can make comparisons. If there were such a standard, we might expect 
the normative requirements I am talking about to feed into this super-standard. They would 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Raz, op. cit., p. 322 and 325. 
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then be reduced to mere considerations that we can compare simpliciter and determine what 
we ought simpliciter. The idea of incommensurability is what keeps the theory from 
collapsing into normative monism. Each standard and each ought is kept separate from the 
others by the kind of self-sufficiency that incommensurability involves. If there was a 
common standard that generated super-oughts, then that kind of ought would be the 
fundamental normative concept that made genuine requirements on our actions. Holding the 
oughts to be incommensurates, that they cannot be compared in a neutral comprehensive 
fashion, is the only way in which they can each maintain their own normative status, and by 
which there can indeed be a multiplicity of oughts. 
 
 
2.2.2 Normative Standards 
I have been speaking of standards on a more or less casual note. In this section I will try to 
explain the meaning of this term and how it functions within the theory. In ordinary usage, the 
term can refer to a measure, or to a test, or to a criterion of excellence. When I speak of 
normative standards, I think of such a test, measure, or criterion that determines whether some 
ought-proposition is true or whether something counts as a reason. For instance, morality may 
be such a standard. Prudence may be another. When I am confronted with a practical situation 
and I consider how to act, I may consult with or reason within one of these standards. I can 
use the tests or criteria of the moral or prudential standard to determine what I ought or what 
counts as a reason in the situation confronting me. Another way of putting it is that I can use a 
standard to determine whether some candidate action measures up to what I truly ought, or 
whether it measures up to a reason. 
 
A natural thought for the normative pluralist is to hold that there is a plurality of these 
normative standards. I already mentioned two, morality and prudence, but there may be many 
more. I will not try to provide a list. All that matters for the normative pluralist is that there 
would be more than one. The reason why it matters is that it is a natural and plausible way to 
account for the incommensurability of oughts (or reasons). If it is true that you prudentially 
ought to ϕ, but morally ought not to, that may be because ϕ-ing is required by the prudential 
standard (prudence), while the moral standard requires you not to (it forbids it). The two 
standards thus make us able to comprehend that the same action can be something that is 
normatively required and prohibited at the same time, and it can make us understand why. 
The reason why, is that there exist different standards with different criteria for determining 
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its normative requiredness. That these standards exist, and that they have different criteria and 
can require different and conflicting things, is also a very plausible assumption that I think 
few would care to deny.  
 
While I would like to leave the understanding of standards at an intuitive level, I also realise 
that some may want to object to this because they find the concept to be unclear as it 
seemingly can refer to different things. Consider the idea of an algorithm. An algorithm is a 
decision procedure, with a set of rules that will result in a solution if those rules are followed. 
Decision- and game theory may be taken as a particular conception of the standard of 
prudence or rationality24. If we do that, then prudence or rationality will be understood as an 
algorithmic standard. In morality, certain versions of utilitarianism could also be understood 
as algorithmic. Certain approaches to law could also be taken this way25. However, not 
everyone is happy with such algorithmic theories. William Child has argued that rationality 
can not be taken as algorithmic26, while some deontological theories says the same about 
morality, and common law theories could be seen to say the same about the law. The precise 
arguments for any of these positions do not concern us here. What we need to answer is 
whether the standards need to be understood in an algorithmic fashion.  
 
I think that this is not the case. In explaining the meaning of the term ‘standard’, I said that 
what I was thinking of when using this term was a test, measure or criterion that determines 
whether some ought-proposition is true or whether something counts as a reason. When 
making this claim, I did not intend to imply that the standard must be an algorithm. What I 
would rather claim is that a standard is a set of tests or criteria that contributes toward 
determining what one ought. This means that once every feature of the situation is taken into 
account, concluding what one ought may not be just a simple matter of deduction. A standard 
can leave room for judgement (perhaps because of vagueness in the criteria at hand). 
 
What seems to me to be essential for a standard though, is being able to sort out relevant 
features in determining what to do. Another way to put it is that a standard must contain 
criteria of relevance. An easy way to grasp this would be to imagine that each standard can be 
                                                 
24 Bayesianism could for example be understood to hold that our beliefs are normatively governed by a set of 
statistical rules. 
25 The early Prussian code of law Allgemeines Landrecht für die preussischen Staaten might for instance 
plausibly be said to embody such an ideal. 
26 Child, William, ”Anomalism, Uncodifiability, Psychophysical Relations”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 
102, No. 2 (April 1993: 215-245).  
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understood as having some special function. Theoretical rationality might for instance be 
understood as ‘truth-seeking’, while prudence could be understood a ‘welfare-maximizing’27. 
Assume now that a certain standard, call it Self-Interest, has the function of maximizing 
expected subjective utility. In determining what one ought, this standard might determine that 
the fact that someone might be hurt by my action does not matter, given that I do not care 
about it. Given that I am indifferent to the other person’s harm, that feature is not relevant for 
my utility. We could also take the example the other way around. By a certain conception of 
the moral standard, my increased utility may not matter if that same action would violate 
someone’s rights. The moral philosopher would say that this feature is not morally relevant28. 
 
We can now see that being algorithmic is just an especially strong type of standard. An 
algorithmic standard sorts out relevance trivially by making everything that falls outside the 
decision procedure irrelevant by default. The difference between an algorithmic and a non-
algorithmic standard is just that the algorithmic standard also provides a comprehensive set of 
rules that allows us to mechanically deduce the right answer. Other standards may not have 
such a step-by-step procedure and may call for judgement in various degrees. One thing that 
could be argued however, is that normative pluralism allows a way for practical reasoning to 
be algorithmic that would otherwise be more problematic. If we were to try to codify how one 
ought to act, one might well come to see that there are so many kinds of reasons and so many 
different considerations to make (perhaps in direct contradiction), that the project could soon 
come to be thought impossible. On the other hand, if one assumes normative pluralism, then 
considerations could each be understood as relative to a specific standard. Although we would 
not end up with an algorithm for what we ought simpliciter, we could – now that we have 
isolated the different considerations – try to construct algorithmic interpretations of each 
specific standard, thus making all our practical reasoning algorithmically governed. While this 
might be a theoretical possibility, I have not argued that this actually is the case. I believe that 
judgement could be called for within many of the standards, but since this depends on what 
theories one holds about each individual standard, it falls outside the scope of this discussion.  
 
I have now been addressing the question of the nature of normative standards. However, not 
everyone believes that general standards like these are a necessary or even desirable part of 
                                                 
27 I am not making the claim here that theoretical rationality is truth-seeking, or that prudence is welfare-
maximizing, only that these are examples of functions that these standards could be thought to have. 
28 I think one should note here how relevance is used in a way such that it is adverbially modified. 
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practical philosophy. Particularists like Jonathan Dancy can be seen to hold such a position 
when they argue against the use of principles in moral (and other practical) reasoning29. My 
account of normativity may seem objectionable to particularists because I have claimed that 
we use general standards to determine what we ought and the relevancy of specific features.  
While I believe that it would be difficult for particularists to deny that these general standards 
exist, they would none the less hold that our practical reasoning does not depend on them in 
any way30. 
 
In reply to this, I would first like to point out that the use of standards is not an essential part 
of the theory of normative pluralism. By that, I mean that a standard-based account of 
practical reasoning is not a logically necessary part of the claims of that theory. The only 
things that must hold for the theory to be true is that there exists several kinds of oughts (or 
reasons), and that each of these is truly normative. It is therefore perfectly possible (in a 
logical sense) for the theory that we have a plurality of oughts without this being accounted 
for in any way by standards. In that case, it seems to me like the oughts would just be 
different, pure and simple. The incommensurability that would exist between the oughts 
would seem to have a brute character.  
 
While the standards thus are not a logical necessity for the theory, I never the less think that 
the standards fill an important task in explaining the difference in kind between the various 
oughts31. The explanation is that if oughts are somehow derived from standards with different 
functions, then there would be incommensurability (and hence difference) between them 
because they are derived from different systems of measurement or assessment. The standards 
of morality and prudence can account for why you morally ought to ϕ, while prudentially 
ought not to, and that is because ϕ-ing is appropriate to the considerations of the moral 
standard, and it is not so for the prudential. Of course, it might be that something else than 
standards could also be held to explain the incommensurability and difference of oughts, but it 
is not clear to me what else could do the job. If the difference is not to be brute, we need to 
appeal to something, and normative standards seem to me to be the best candidate. 
 
                                                 
29 His particularism does not seem to hold only for moral reasons since he says that moral reasons function like 
other kinds of reasons in not depending on the use of principles. See Dancy, Jonathan, Ethics Without Principles, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 76. 
30 Ibid., p. 7. 
31 Joseph Raz also uses the idea of standards and what he calls genres to account for his value pluralism. See 
Raz, Joseph, The Practice of Value, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 39. 
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This may be taken by the particularist to mean that we should deny normative pluralism, 
because without standards, the claims of the theory become somewhat mysterious. It seems 
like normative pluralism would have to accept a form of generalism if it is to be explainable. 
Yet we should note three things. The first is that the principles contained in the standards need 
be nothing more than principles for assessing relevancy. It need not be the strong absolute or 
contributory principles that Dancy argues so fervently against; the kind that takes certain 
types of actions as always right or wrong in an absolute or pro tanto fashion. The principles of 
the standards need say nothing about types of actions, and can be limited to just assessing 
token actions in particular cases. The second is that normative pluralism involves a strong 
form of incommensurability that Dancy finds attractive in accounting for the existence of 
tragic dilemmas32. The third is that unlike the generalist theories Dancy argues against, 
normative pluralism can account for the notion of regret, and in a stronger way than Dancy 
can. I shall come back to this in 2.5.3. 
 
 
2.3 Objections to Normative Pluralism 
In this section I will discuss some objections to the theory of normative pluralism. These 
objections are all raised by authors who hold monistic theories of norms and normativity. All 
the authors I present here have a rather similar framework. While they raise somewhat 
different objections, these are never the less related, and most of them are raised because of a 
particular conception of practical rationality that these authors seem, more or less, to share. 
 
 
2.3.1  Broome’s View 
John Broome thinks that the fundamental normative concept is that of ‘ought’, and more 
specifically, a special type of ought which he calls the ‘ought all things considered’. 
According to Broome it is only this concept which can be seen as a central normative concept. 
However, he does agree that we sometimes speak of various other types of ought. For 
instance, we sometimes speak about what we morally ought in contrast with what we 
rationally ought, or prudentially ought. Broome calls these types of oughts adverbial oughts33. 
As I explained in 2.2, it is these adverbial types of ought that I believe can all be seen as 
                                                 
32 Dancy, Jonathan, Moral Reasons, (Oxford, UK & Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), p. 123. 
33 Broome, op. cit., p. 20. 
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fundamental and which makes up for the plural aspect of normativity. So Broome represents 
an opposite view, and he explicitly argues against the view I have outlined. 
 
Broome believes that “the concept of ought all things considered is really just the concept of 
ought. Saying you ought all things considered to do something is just to say you ought to do 
it”34. In Broome’s view, this does not seem to be the case for adverbial oughts. He prefers not 
to speak of these oughts as actual oughts, but instead to speak about them as requirements. 
Thus we can have moral, prudential, or rational requirements.  
 
The concept of a requirement is not inherently normative35. If I say that “x requires y”, I am 
not necessarily saying anything normative. An example Broome uses is “Catholicism requires 
people not to use condoms”. By using this proposition, you are not necessarily saying 
anything against the use of condoms. On the other hand, you could be. When you say that 
some action is prudentially required, you most often are speaking in favour of that act in a 
normative sense. This means that even requirements can be normative. But Broome thinks 
that even “if a requirement on you to F is normative, it does not necessarily follow that you 
ought to F”36. What requirements instead do is that they help determine what you ought all 
things considered. Broome writes: 
 
Separate normative requirements, issuing from different sources, feed into the central, overall ought; 
together they determine what you ought to do, ought to believe, ought to be, and so on. So in a way, 
normativity is broken into parts, but all the parts come together in the central ought. The different 
sources of requirements do not threaten the single central normative concept of ought.37 
 
This then is how Broome conceives the so-called adverbial oughts. Not as true oughts, but as 
requirements which may form part of the consideration for why we ought something. I say 
‘may’ because it could be that not all requirements are normative. While we might say that 
moral requirements should always be taken into consideration, the fact that Catholicism 
requires something may not be able to take any part in determining the truth of what we 
ought. It might be true in the first place that we ought not to follow Catholic requirements. 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 But we should recognize that nor is ’ought’. Broome himself recognizes that there is a predictive usage of 
’ought’. Ibid., p. 9. 
36 Ibid., p. 21. 
37 Ibid., p. 22. 
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The content of the requirement may just be a fact about what is correct according to 
Catholicism, and yet not be any kind of reason for doing it.  
 
Broome’s way of conceiving adverbial oughts seems to support the conclusion that ‘ought all 
things considered’ is the single central normative concept. However, what Broome have done 
here is merely conceiving these oughts in a different way than I did in 2.2. The account of 
these oughts that I gave yields a different conclusion from his, so I do not believe that he 
succeeds in rejecting the thought that we have a plurality of central normative concepts just by 
these claims alone. If that was all Broome had to say, he would be begging the question 
against normative pluralism. Yet he does have another kind of argument. While this first line 
of thought was that we can understand the adverbial oughts simply as requirements and not as 
real oughts, this second argument holds that a plurality of oughts would make oughts unfit for 
engaging our practical rationality38. The reason is that various types of oughts could come 
into conflict, as when we say that you prudentially ought to F, although you morally ought not
to. This leads to a deontic conflict, and Broome believes for reasons that will become 
apparent, that there cannot be any deontic conflicts. Now, Broome rightly notices th
proposition by itself does not lead to any such conflict. From the fact that you prudentially 
ought to F, it does not follow that you ought simpliciter to F. The oughts, he rightly claims, 
cannot be detached from their adverbs. So there is no paradox in saying that you prudentially 
ought to F, but morally ought not to F. 
 
at such a 
                                                
 
However, assume for one moment that I am right in thinking that there is no single central 
concept of ought all things considered, but that all we have are the various adverbial oughts. 
The problem here is that these oughts should be able to “engage our practical rationality”. 
According to Broome, the way in which they can do that is through a requirement of 
rationality which tells you intend to F if you believe you ought to F39. But if this is right, and 
you can rightly believe both that you ought to F and ought not to F, then you might rationally 
end up intending both to F and not to F. However, since this conclusion can’t be right, neither 
can all the premises. The reason why this can not be right is that it would imply that 
rationality requires you to form contradictory intentions, and this would be an implausible 
conception of rationality. To intend both to F and not to F certainly seems irrational on any 
plausible account of rationality, and it would seem incoherent that rationality should require 
 
38 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
39 See Broome, op. cit., p. 78 for a more precise statement of this requirement. 
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irrational things.  Broome therefore thinks that there cannot be any conflicts in what we ought 
to do, and therefore that there cannot be more than one central normative concept. 
 
 
2.3.2  Kolodny’s View 
Niko Kolodny’s thinking has much in common with Broome, but the context in which 
Kolodny argues against multiple oughts is especially interesting. On several occasions, 
Broome raises the question whether the requirements of rationality are normative. His 
conclusion is skeptical. He says that although he finds it intuitive that they are normative; he 
nevertheless can not show this to be the case40. Some times it might be true that you ought to 
be irrational, and he therefore says that he can find no grounds for thinking that rationality is 
normative41. Kolodny follows up on this point, and argues explicitly that rationality is only 
apparently normative, and that it is not genuinely normative in the sense that there are reasons 
to be rational42. While the fact that a rational requirement applies to one always seems to be 
normative, it is not so in fact.  
 
The reason why Kolodny brings up the question of multiple oughts is that adopting a plurality 
of oughts is one way for his opponents to argue that rationality can be understood as 
normative after all. Perhaps one might…  
 
…bite the bullet and accept that alongside the primitive ‘ought’ of reasons, there is a distinct, primitive 
‘ought’ of rationality? On a certain line of thought, this might not seem troubling: ‘There are lots of 
“oughts”’, one might say. ‘There is the “ought”, for example, of the rules of chess.43 
 
Kolodny then goes on to say that the problem is that the ‘ought’ of chess is purely 
classificatory44. To use these oughts is simply to say that in so far as one is to do what will 
count as playing chess, one must follow its rules. So, one could argue that to say that one 
‘ought rationally to F’ is merely to say that not to F counts as irrational. The content here is 
only descriptive, and thus does not count as saying anything normative. However, Kolodny 
sees that this would be a bad interpretation of the oughts of rationality, because these oughts 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 106. 
41 Ibid., p. 107. 
42 Kolodny, Niko, ”Why Be Rational?”, in Mind, (Vol. 114, July 2005, 509-563), p. 513. We could rephrase the 
claim to state that rationality is not genuinely rational in the sense that you ought to be rational. 




do seem to be prescriptive. We are not merely making a descriptive claim – we are also 
recommending45. He also notes that, unlike the oughts of chess, the oughts of rationality 
apply in every situation. This means that appealing to a second primitive normativity of 
rationality (a plurality of oughts), is more significant and involves much more than the 
analogy to the oughts of chess might suggest.  
                                                
 
This is for Kolodny a strong reason why one should accept his view that rationality is not 
normative, for he seems to think that although a normative pluralism might give us the 
opportunity to understand rationality as normative, such normative pluralism would involve 
so much that it would be obviously unattractive. One reason for this is parsimony. Why 
introduce all these different ought-concepts when one could accept Kolodny’s much simpler 
view? A more important reason is the apparent “difficulty of understanding how we are to be 
governed by these two autonomous ‘ought’s” when these oughts come into conflict”46. The 
difficulty seems to boil down to the following conundrum. If there is a conflict between two 
oughts, then what really ought one to do in these conflicts? Some compromise? Or is it rather 
that we cannot even ask what we really ought to do, only what one ought-in-the-rationality-
sense to do and what one ought-in-the-other-sense to do? Both of these are “unpalatable” 
alternatives, Kolodny claims47. 
 
 
2.3.3 Wedgwood’s View 
Ralph Wedgwood’s objections to a plurality of fundamental normative concepts are very 
similar to Broome’s. The difference mainly lies in that Wedgwood explicitly objects to 
normative pluralism by committing himself to normative judgement internalism (NJI).  
 
Wedgwood’s first objection is identical with Broome’s first objection. Adverbial oughts are 
not genuine normative oughts. Rather, he too seems to think that the various requirements that 
the standards generate can be weighed against each other such that what we ought is what we 
ought all things considered. Wedgwood writes: 
 
Consider a case where you know that you are morally required to do X, and prudentially required to do 
Y, but it is impossible to do both. In this case, it seems quite intelligible for you to ask  yourself “Ought 
 





I to do what I am morally required to do, X? Or ought I to do what I am prudentially required to, Y?” 
Neither of these questions seem equivalent to the trivial question “Ought I to do what I ought to do?” 
But if that is true, then the term ‘ought’ cannot occur here in a narrowly moral sense, or a narrowly 
prudential sense. It must occur here in a more general normative sense. When understood in this way, a 
statement of the form ‘A ought to ϕ’ seems equivalent to a certain interpretation of the corresponding 
statement ‘There is a conclusive reason for A to ϕ’. This statement does not just mean that A is morally 
required to ϕ, or that it would best serve A’s interests or purposes of A to ϕ; it means that A ought to ϕ 
all things considered…48 
 
Because we can still ask whether or not we ought to do whatever some adverbial ought 
requires of us, the adverbial oughts cannot really be the fundamental normative oughts. It 
must be the ought that takes all the requirements into consideration that is the true normative 
ought. 
 
Another reason why the adverbial oughts can’t be fundamental is that the first-person question 
“What ought I to do?” is also a deliberative question49. That is, it is not simply a question 
about what I ought to do, but also a question about what to do. The reason why this is so is 
that when interpreting your question we can assume that you are rational50, and if you are 
rational, then you will intend to do what you judge you ought to do. Wedgwood therefore 
thinks that this claim (which I shall refer to as NJI) is true: 
 
(NJI) Necessarily, if one is rational, then, if one judges ‘I ought to ϕ’, one also 
intends to ϕ.51 
 
We can see that NJI seems to be very similar to Broome’s requirement of rationality. Broome 
said that rationality requires that you intend to ϕ if you believe you ought to ϕ. Both writers 
therefore seem to hold that for a rational person, the question about what one ought to do and 
what to intend cannot be separated. Broome points out that if we assume this requirement or 
NJI, and also assume normative pluralism, then rationality would require contradictory things 
of you. Wedgwood’s arguments seem to point out further that if normative pluralism were 
true, such that we could know that we morally ought to ϕ, while at the same time knowing 
that we prudentially ought to not ϕ, then that would make us akratic no matter what we 
                                                 
48 Wedgwood, op. cit., p. 24. 
49 Ibid., p. 25. 
50 The assumption of rationality is argued for by for example Davidson. See section 1.2.1. 
51 Wedgwood, op. cit., p. 25. 
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intend. Akrasia – weakness of the will – consists in willingly failing to do something that one 
judges one ought to do, Wedgwood claims52. So if it is a common thing that the standards 
require incompatible things of us, then we would necessarily be irrational on a common 
basis53. More importantly however, this definition of akrasia seems to support NJI, because if 
you judge that you ought to ϕ, and yet do not intend to ϕ, you are being akratic, and hence 
irrational. And if NJI is true, then that would also seem to validate Broome’s requirement, and 
thus Broome’s objection against normative pluralism. 
 
 
2.4  Replies to the Objections 
Having presented various objections to normative pluralism in the previous sections, I now 
intend to answer these objections. Each objection will demand a reply, and I shall conclude 
that neither of them causes much damage to normative pluralism. I will start out by making a 
separate reply to Kolodny’s discomforts, and then move on to Broome and Wedgwood whose 
arguments are sufficiently similar to justify treating them together. Answering Kolodny’s 
objections will be helpful in clarifying my position. I will then consider Broome’s and 
Wedgwood’s alternative views of normativity. Broome’s argument that plural oughts will be 
inconsistent with the requirements of rationality is the most challenging of the objections, and 
I shall leave that for last. 
 
 
2.4.1 Reply to Kolodny: What One Really Ought 
One consideration that Kolodny mentions against multiple oughts is that of parsimony. By 
introducing multiple ought-concepts, we introduce more concepts than is really needed in 
order to provide solutions to our philosophical problems. Kolodny can of course make this 
claim since he thinks his own account provide philosophical solutions without any additional 
ought-concepts. The obvious answer to this is that the reason or motivation for why we would 
like to introduce them is that they actually do solve a number of philosophical problems. For 
instance, we saw that Kolodny drew the conclusion that rationality can not be understood as 
genuinely normative. I think that this conclusion is highly implausible, and that Kolodny’s 
account therefore does not solve our philosophical problems in a good way. If we on the 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Wedgwood does not make this claim explicitly, but I think it can be read off from what he writes on the 
matter. See Wedgwood, op. cit., pp. 25-28. 
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contrary could introduce a rational type of normative ought, then rationality would be 
normative and we would not be forced to accept the problematical conclusion that Kolodny 
draws. There are also other philosophical phenomena that I believe requires normative 
pluralism in order to be accounted for. For more on this see section 2.5. 
 
In any case, I do not think Kolodny would press this point. His main argument was that if we 
had several oughts, we could not give an unpuzzling answer to the question of what we really 
ought to do in cases where the oughts conflict. First he asks if it is to be some compromise. I 
must admit that I have a hard time understanding what he means by this question. It isn’t clear 
to me that we can at all imagine a compromise position in all possible cases. Suppose I 
morally ought to ϕ, but prudentially ought not to ϕ, and that the difference between ϕ-ing and 
not ϕ-ing is discrete. How would a compromise position look like here? It seems to me that 
there can’t be any compromise. In other cases there could be compromises though. This 
would be the case if the difference between the required actions is continuous. Thus if I 
morally ought to give $10 to charity and prudentially ought to give $0, then a compromise 
could be seen as giving $5. Should we then compromise in these cases? I think no. Such a 
compromise could not be justified because it would not satisfy, and would thus not be 
supported by, any ought-fact. And even if I can find some standard of reasoning which allows 
me to reach a compromised ought, it still remains true that I morally ought to give $10 and 
prudentially ought to give $0. Moreover, in order to avoid his position to collapse into 
normative monism, I believe the normative pluralist has to hold that the different oughts are 
incommensurable. With the idea of incommensurability, it is hard to see how compromises 
could be made. At least it would not be possible to make comparisons of strength and find out 
what option would be most supported, be it an initial option or a compromise option. 
 
Kolodny’s section alternative to the question of what we really ought to do given a plurality 
of oughts is that we cannot even ask what one really ought to do, only what one ought-in-the-
rationality-sense to do and what one ought in some other sense to do. Is this then what the 
normative pluralist is forced to say? The answer to this is both yes and no. According to 
normative pluralism, the central normative concept (like ‘ought’) is always relativized to 
some normative standard. We can only ask what we morally ought, rationally ought, 
prudentially ought, and so on. It is therefore true that we only can ask (sensibly) what we 
ought in this or that sense. On the other hand, it is not the case that the normative pluralist 
must say that there is nothing that we really ought, and I fail to see what has led Kolodny to 
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think so. On the contrary, the normative pluralist is actually committed to saying that there are 
things we really ought, and that there are in fact many things that we really ought. All the 
relativized oughts are taken as true oughts; they are meant to be true facts about reality. If that 
is what Kolodny means by ‘really’, then Kolodny is wrong in suggesting that for the pluralist 
must say that there is nothing we really ought, and this does indeed seems to me to be the 
most natural interpretation of that word. It might very well be though, that Kolodny means 
something else than what is in fact true of the world. It might be that what he means is that if 
the pluralist is right, then there would be nothing we ought simpliciter, that is, nonrelativized. 
However, this is just what normative pluralism claims, so it amounts to no objection against 
it. It could nevertheless be related to various concerns about how multiple oughts can handle 
other philosophical problems, like practical reasoning. But Kolodny makes no argument as to 
why it could be problematic. He simply says that the alternative is “unpalatable”. I, on the 
other hand, think that this position might be very palatable.  
 
 
2.4.2 Reply to Broome and Wedgwood: The Ought All Things Considered and What 
Rationality Requires 
Both Broome and Wedgwood advocate theories of normativity that are inconsistent with my 
own. They are both normative monists. The reason why this label is an appropriate one for 
them is that they both think that the fundamental normative concept is just that of the ought 
all things considered. Wedgwood said that because we can still ask the question of whether or 
not we ought to do whatever we morally or prudentially ought, those adverbial oughts cannot 
be our fundamental oughts. It would rather be the unqualified ought here, which Wedgwood 
identifies with the ‘ought all things considered’, that must be the fundamental ought. Broome 
seems to suggest the same when he says that from the fact that there is an adverbial 
requirement, it doesn’t necessarily follow that you ought to follow that requirement. There 
must be a more fundamental ought than the adverbial ones. 
 
While it is true that we can in some sense ask the question of whether we ought what we 
morally ought or prudentially ought54, it does not follow, and it seems to me not to be true, 
that there must be a more fundamental ought that would govern the adverbial oughts. As I 
explained in 2.2, it is perfectly possible to imagine an unqualified ought simpliciter that could 
                                                 
54 See chapter 3 for more on this. 
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be seen to govern the other oughts. We have the unqualified concept of ‘ought’. However, I 
also tried to explain that what I am engaged with is building an ontological theory, not a 
semantic theory. I do not wish to deny that we can imagine an ought simpliciter, but I do wish 
do deny the thought that there is an ought simpliciter. I do not think there is an all-things-
considered ought because I think that the various adverbial oughts are incommensurable. 
Broome and Wedgwood still has to show that there actually is an ought simpliciter, and 
moreover, it seems to me that if they want to claim that there is such an ought, they have to 
show how those adverbial oughts can be weighed up against each other – that is, they need to 
show how the various oughts can be commensurable. It is not enough to say merely that 
because we can imagine the concept of an ought all things considered, then the adverbial 
oughts must be commensurable. 
 
There is one attempt to shortcut this problem. It might be said that although we have no clear 
idea of how exactly we do the weighing, such weighing must be possible because we know 
that it exists. We know that it exists because we have certain examples of conflicting 
requirements where the answer seems to be very clear. We can call these examples nominal-
notable comparisons. Suppose I am in a situation where there is a conflict of requirements. 
Morality requires me to ϕ, while prudence requires me not to ϕ. Suppose further that what is 
gained morally is very slight, call it ‘nominal’, whereas what is gained according to prudential 
considerations is very great, call it ‘notable’. An example of such a situation would perhaps be 
a situation where you would gain a large amount of money by acting slightly immorally. The 
example can be reversed without that fact making a difference. There could be a great moral 
gain by forsaking a slight prudential gain. The suggestion is that in such nominal-notable 
situations, we clearly ought to follow the notable requirement. The reason seems to be that the 
nominal requirement is so slight that it is outweighed by the notable alternative. This is a 
common argument for those who argue against value incommensurability55. Although I have 
nothing to say about its application to values, I do not think it succeeds in showing that 
normative requirements, with their deontic character, are commensurable. The reason is 
simply that it seems far from obvious that you really ought (in any unqualified sense) to 
choose the notable option. The argument above would in effect tell us to ignore moral 
demands, and it doesn’t seem clear to me that moral demands, no matter how slight can be 
outweighed by non-moral gains. It seems reasonable to me that moral requirements, whatever 
                                                 
55 See for example Ruth Chang, “Introduction”, p. 14-15. 
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they are, should be understood as duties56. That is, it seems to me, what it is to be a 
requirement of any kind. 
 
So if the problem of how the adverbial oughts are to be weighed cannot be circumvented, then 
Broome and Wedgwood owe us an explanation of how this can be done57. It seems to me that 
it cannot be done. Take again morality and prudence. The criteria that determines what ought 
to be done according to these two standards, are so different that it is hard to see how any 
weighing is to take place. Let us suppose that morality is concerned with the welfare of others 
(or everyone), and prudence is concerned with the welfare of oneself (and possibly those 
which one cares about). If there is a conflict between these two standards, I do not see how it 
is to be resolved in a neutral all-things-considered kind of way.  
 
It might still be said, in the spirit of nominal-notable comparisons, that my conclusion that 
there is no ought all things considered cannot be right because there obviously must be such 
an ought. We seem to reach such oughts all the time, and the concept figures prominently in 
our speech and behaviour. This objection seems to me to be right. I do not wish to deny that 
we can reach any kind of all things considered oughts, I am only interested in denying that we 
can reach a certain kind of such an ought. The kind that I am interested in denying is the 
unqualified ought simpliciter – that is, the fundamental, single ought that monists advocate 
and that can be said to govern all other oughts. It is perfectly possible to reach a moral or a 
prudential all things considered ought. I assume that the conclusions we reach about what we 
ought have all weighed different considerations against each other and have thus reached an 
all things considered conclusion. But those considerations would be specific kinds of 
considerations, like moral considerations or prudential considerations, and the conclusions 
will be moral or prudential (or some other) conclusions. In order to reach conclusions about 
what we ought, we must use some kind of criterion, and that criterion determines the character 
of the reasoning. The only thing I deny is that there is no neutral way of reasoning about what 
we ought. There is no criterion which is in some absolute, unqualified way superior to the 
other criteria, or which takes priority in such a way. Thus we can have moral all things 
                                                 
56 I do not mean to imply deontology. The utilitarian principle is also a duty. I also wish to warn against some 
connotations with the word ’duty’. Duty is most often used in a moral sense, but I do not use the word in that 
sense. The only thing I wish to convey with the word is that there are certain deontic properties involved. 
57 In his book about the weighing of goods, Broome mentions the problem of incommensurability, but puts it 
aside. See John Broome, Weighing Goods, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford & Cambridge, MA, 1991), p. 93. 
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considered oughts, prudential all things considered oughts, and perhaps even aesthetic all 
things considered oughts, but we can not have all things considered oughts simpliciter. 
 
Both Broome and Wedgwood attempts to deny normative pluralism by appealing to the 
notion of an all things considered ought, but those claims do no more than represent the 
opposite, rival view. They do not amount to an argument against normative pluralism, and 
unless they can make a more substantive case for believing that the ought all things 
considered simpliciter exist, or that normative pluralism must be false, then their appeal to 
this monistic concept should be viewed as ineffective.   
 
 
Requirements of Rationality  
The best strategy that the monist has in denying normative pluralism is to appeal to the notion 
of practical reasoning and the rules that are supposed to govern it. Both Broome and 
Wedgwood make such an appeal, although Broome does it most explicitly. The appeal to 
practical reasoning is fundamentally the thought that having a plurality of normative concepts 
(whether they be oughts, reasons, or requirements) creates certain problems, and the major 
reason behind these problems is thought to be that these different normative concepts can 
require conflicting things. The problem is that of how practical reason can deal with such 
normative conflicts.  
 
Understanding practical reasoning on the normative monist’s view might be thought to be 
fairly simple. The requirements of rationality require you to do or intend whatever you ought 
all things considered, or what you believe you ought all things considered. Rationality simply 
requires of you whatever is required of you by the fundamental normative concept. There is 
no conflict. If you bring in multiple fundamental normative concepts and the possibility of 
conflict, then things get much more complicated. The monist can therefore say that his view 
on practical reason is much more simple and much less problematic, and in this claim the 
monist is probably right. How much weight we should attach to this simplicity is another 
question however. 
 
John Broome never the less claims much more than that monism can provide the simpler view 
of practical reasoning. He claims that the requirements of rationality can prove that normative 
monism must be false. Since this supposed proof is the strongest argument against normative 
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pluralism, it might now be worth repeating it one more time. Underlying his objection is a 
particular conception of practical reasoning. Broome advocates a requirement of rationality 
which tells you to intend to F if you believe you ought to F. The proof is a reductio. Suppose 
now that we accept normative pluralism, and suppose further (as is natural) that two different 
standards can make conflicting requirements on you in such a way that it is true tat you 
prudentially ought to F and morally ought to not F. Suppose that you know this. If these two 
conditions hold, then Broome’s rationality requirement will tell you to intend to F and to 
intend to not F. The proof relies on the thought that this is inconsistent with rationality. It 
certainly seems irrational to intend to F and to intend to not F at the same time. And 
rationality can certainly not make irrational requirements. That would be incoherent. So it 
cannot be true that you both ought to F and ought to not F. There is therefore only one ought, 
and only one central normative concept. 
 
There are at least two ways to misunderstand the argument. The first way is by supposing that 
the problem is simply that one could perform several acts of practical deliberation, and then 
end up with several, perhaps incompatible and contradictory, intentions. It might be said that 
this is just a reasonable account of human psychology. We might form lots of intentions, some 
incompatible, and the world is simply so that it is impossible to realize them all. While 
contradictory intentions would be irrational, that problem could be prevented by the standard 
of rationality which would require us not to form them. Even though one could, one 
shouldn’t. Although normative pluralism makes it possible to form contradictory intentions, 
one of the normative standards is that of rationality, and this standard requires us not to form 
such intentions. If a person has a propensity for rationality, that person would be kept away 
from irrationality. But the problem was not just that if normative pluralism is true, then 
forming several, possibly conflicting, intentions would be possible. The problem was that 
rationality requires you to intend what you ought, and if normative pluralism is true, then 
rationality itself would require you to form contradictory intentions. Rationality would then be 
incoherent, and it would not be possible to appeal to it to prevent you from forming 
contradictory intentions. The problem lies with how rationality would look like if we accept 
pluralism, not just with the fact that there would be normative conflicts. 
 
The second way to misunderstand it is by supposing that any weight is put on agglomeration. 
One could deny the fact that rationality requires you to (F and not F). Rather, it makes two 
separate requirements. Rationality requires you to F, and rationality requires you to not F. But 
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Broome’s argument does not appeal to any agglomeration. Making separate, but conflicting, 
requirements is equally irrational. Both ways of requiring is supposed to end up in intentions, 
and those conflicting intentions are what is at issue. And unlike oughts, which are adverbially 
modified, intentions – it seems to me – can be agglomerated.  
 
So Broome’s objection against normative pluralism can be located squarely within the domain 
of practical reason. It seems like we cannot reconcile the requirements of rationality with a 
plurality of oughts. Since this is the core of the problem, it seems strange to me that Broome 
uses the strong term proof to describe his objection against normative pluralism. The reason 
why I find it strange is that the only thing that Broome might have proved is just that there is a 
conflict between a certain conception of the requirements of rationality and normative 
pluralism. It does not follow from this that pluralism must be wrong. We might equally 
conclude from this that it is Broome’s rationality requirement that is wrong. But indeed, I 
think Broome even fails to establish that there is a conflict in the first place. Broome’s 
requirement of rationality and normative pluralism might be reconcilable after all.  
 
Broome’s requirement is phrased in the following manner. Call it requirement (a). 
 
(a) Rationality requires of you that, if you believe you ought that you* F, you 
intend to F. 
 
The star is simply used to indicate a reflexive pronoun.  
 
In a certain way, requirement (a) seems like an intuitive requirement of rationality. I hardly 
wish to deny its intuitive appeal. On the other hand, there is an interpretation of the 
requirement on which I believe the requirement turns out to be false. Still, let us start with the 
interpretation on which it turns out true.  
 
Remember that Broome’s fundamental normative concept is that of the ought all things 
considered. It is this, and only this, concept which tells us what we ought, and therefore what 
we ought to intend. Broome seems to say that this concept is what the requirement applies 
to58. Whenever I believe that all things considered I ought to F, then rationality requires of me 
                                                 
58 Broome, Reasoning, p. 18. 
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that I intend to F. I believe that this requirement may well be true. The problem with it is that 
there is nothing which I ought all things considered in Broome’s unqualified sense. I shall not 
repeat the arguments against the monist normative concept yet again. The point is that 
although it may be true that for all such monistic all-things-considered oughts, you ought to 
intend them, it is still false that there are such oughts. This means that requirement (a) can be 
true, but has no application59. And if Broome means for (a) to have this limited application, 
then his argument against pluralism fails. For it will then not be true that rationality requires 
that I intend whatever I ought in some adverbial sense. Requirement (a) does not apply to 
these kinds of oughts. This means that rationality will not require me to form conflicting 
intentions, and hence rationality does not become incoherent. 
 
The interpretation where requirement (a) seems to me to be false is when (a) requires you to 
intend whatever you believe you adverbially ought to intend. It seems false that rationality 
requires you to intend all the different things that you morally ought, prudentially ought, and 
so on. A major reason why it would be false is just the fact that if requirement (a) applied to 
adverbial oughts, then Broome’s “proof” would apply – we would be rationally required to 
form conflicting intentions. That this would be so seems to me to be a strong reason why we 
should not interpret requirement (a) in this way. Requirement (a) seems clearly true when 
interpreted in the first way, but false when interpreted in the second way. So if we are 
interested in keeping (a) as a genuine requirement of rationality, then we should adopt the first 
interpretation, and if we do then there is no problem for normative pluralism. Notice also that 
the reason why we should adopt (a) is entirely independent of whether or not we are in the 
first place convinced of normative pluralism. If (a) is meant to apply to adverbial oughts, then 
whether or not these oughts exist, the requirement would still be false.  
 
We would expect the requirements of rationality to behave rationally, so to speak. This means 
that when formulating these requirements, we should try to construct them in such a way that 
they do not result in contradictions or incoherence. If the normative pluralist was to construct 
the requirements, then he would immediately see that an (a)-like requirement which applied to 
adverbial oughts would not be a genuine requirement. If normative pluralism is true, then 
such a requirement cannot be true. Broome is of course not restrained by the premises of 
                                                 
59 This is not quite true, as it may apply on several occasions where I believe that such an ought exist. However, 
in these situations, we might also say that I ought not rationally to believe this in the first place, and that what 
rationality requires of me is to drop the belief. 
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normative pluralism, but he still cannot make up requirements that lead to contradictions 
under certain contingent circumstances. The requirements of rationality, if they are to be 
genuine requirements, cannot be true only under certain circumstances. Requirements hold 
necessarily. Indeed, Broome himself thinks that requirements pick out necessary conditions 
for rationality, and discovering necessary conditions is a good way to delimit the notion of 
rationality60. 
 
In any case, Broome does not himself provide a test of whether some putative requirement is a 
genuine requirement. He says that he can only appeal to our intuitions about rationality61. In 
this case our intuition tells us to reject the second interpretation of (a) as a genuine 
requirement. Intuition can happily embrace the first interpretation, but the requirement that 
would emerge is not relevant for worlds where there are multiple oughts. 
 
The same things can of course also be said about Wedgwood’s NJI. Wedgwood explicitly 
says that the version of NJI that he argues for is exclusively concerned with the ought all 
things considered62. So it might be true that necessarily, if I am rational, then whenever I 
judge that ‘I ought all things considered to ϕ’, then I also intend to ϕ. However, if I am 
rational, then I ought not in the first place to judge that ‘I ought all things considered to ϕ’. 
While possibly true, NJI will never have any effect on rational persons. It has no application.  
 
 
2.4.3 A Common Concern: Practical Reason 
Even though I believe to have answered the explicit objections of Broome, Kolodny, and 
Wedgwood, I also suspect that they would not feel quite satisfied with what I have said. 
Underlying all of their objections and concerns is, I think, a common worry. The worry is the 
question of what the relationship would be between normative facts and our practical 
rationality. Broome formulates the concern when he says that “oughts engage our practical 
rationality”63, and that this is a strong reason for thinking that the adverbial oughts and their 
deontic conflicts do not exist. We have already been through Broome’s argument. Broome 
thinks that there is a requirement of rationality which tells us to intend what we believe we 
ought, and that this requirement creates trouble for the pluralist. We have seen that it doesn’t. 
                                                 
60 Ibid., p. 87. 
61 Ibid., p. 71.  
62 Wedgwood, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
63 Broome, Reasoning, p. 22. 
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Still, there might be a worry. This worry is the concern that without such a requirement, how 
can oughts engage our practical rationality? If deontic conflicts were possible, Broome says, 
oughts could not engage our practical rationality in his sense64. I suspect that something like 
this might be Kolodny’s real concern when he asks the question of what, given multiple 
oughts, we really ought. If we have many oughts, how do we work our way from ought-facts 
to intentions? Broome says that requirement (a) “makes the bridge between theory and 
practice” and that “the point of having normative beliefs at all, is to influence what we do”65. 
This influence is governed by rationality, and more specifically by requirement (a). With this 
requirement we are able to reason our way from normative beliefs to intentions. The challenge 
for the normative pluralist then, is to provide an answer to how this can be done without an 
(a)-like requirement.  
 
That challenge is hard indeed. Yet we should perhaps question whether the challenge is 
presented from sound premises. Let us first take a closer look at requirement (a). We saw that 
while we could take it as true, it had no application to the oughts that exist and that we are 
concerned with here. We have so far not introduced any similar requirement that could govern 
adverbial oughts, and we can suspect that if we do, then we Broome’s objection would apply 
to us. Requirement (a), we can also see, is a very strong requirement, and very unlike the 
other requirements of rationality that Broome presents66. It requires the presence (and the 
formation) of a different type of attitude than a belief, with a content that is not a logical 
consequence of the content of the belief from which it is formed. Also, unlike certain other 
requirements, it is not qualified by mattering. One of Broome’s other requirements is that you 
should believe whatever follows by modus ponens from what you believe, if it matters to 
you67. The qualification is justified by the consideration that you shouldn’t clutter your mind 
with believing every trivial logical consequence of other things you believe. But why 
shouldn’t (a) be qualified in this way. The question is especially prominent for those who 
share the pluralist’s intuition that there are very many things that you ought. Is it necessarily 
true that you should intend all of them? These points highlights how strong the requirement is, 
and how it differs from the other requirements. We could also ask whether the requirement 
actually succeeds in making a bridge between theory and practice. Intentions are just another 
                                                 
64 Ibid., p. 23. 
65 Ibid., p. 78. 
66 I owe the following points to Olav Gjelsvik. 
67 Ibid., p. 74. 
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mental attitude, and if you have a prior intention, that doesn’t necessarily mean that the 
intention will be carried out in action.  
 
Requirement (a) thus stands out as very strong and a bit curious. We might ask if we really 
want such a strong requirement. Does it capture accurately the role of practical reason in how 
we are led from oughts to intentions or actions? Since (a) does not apply to adverbial oughts 
and we cannot make it apply without sacrificing a coherent picture of rationality, it seems as if 
we would need a weaker conception of the role of rationality in practical matters. Although 
(a)-like requirements seem to be widely accepted, they are not accepted by everyone. Joseph 
Raz has offered an alternative that I believe might be more phenomenologically justified. Raz 
thinks that “a proper understanding of human agency, and in particular of the relations 
between the role of cognition and volition in human agency, presupposes that there are 
widespread incommensurabilities of options”68. Raz goes on: 
 
I will contrast two conceptions of human agency, which I will call the rationalist and the classical. In 
broad outline, the rationalist holds that paradigmatic human action is taken because of all the options 
open to the agent, it was in the agent’s view supported by the strongest reason. The classical conception 
holds that the paradigmatic human action is one taken because of all the options the agent considers 
rationally eligible, he chooses to perform it.69  
 
While Raz embraces the “classical” conception, we can see that Broome is committed to the 
“rationalist” conception. Broome requires that we take action out of the ought that is strongest 
supported. Broome thinks that we should weigh various considerations, and that this should 
result in one all things considered ought whose content outweighs other claimants to that title. 
Since I do not think there are any oughts that are the most supported in any neutral or 
privileged way, I am on the other hand committed to denying the rationalist view. Tentatively 
then, I shall accept Raz’s classical view. 
 
I accept Raz’s view a bit carefully because it is somewhat sketchy. Still, I believe that 
something along the line of what Raz suggests must be true. I remain unconvinced by the 
rationalist that normative beliefs somehow determine the intentions or actions in a rational 
person. I do not think rationality is like that. Raz speaks of eligibility instead. The thought 
                                                 
68 Raz, Joseph, ”Incommensurability and Agency”, in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical 
Reason (Ed. Ruth Chang), (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 110. 
69 Ibid., p. 111. 
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seems to be that rationality makes eligible various options and the work of rationality stops 
there. We then simply choose from among these eligible options. I think that this thought can 
be captured well in the language of normative pluralism. Consider various normative 
standards. In a given situation, each of them will generate some set of required, forbidden, or 
allowed actions. Those actions that are required or allowed by a standard are each made 
eligible. These actions are options that are rationally eligible. By saying that, we have 
introduced a new requirement of rationality. Rationality requires that we do not intend 
something that is not made eligible by a standard. If an option is not made eligible by any 
standard, then we ought rationally not to intend it. This requirement may seem to fit better 
with the other requirements of rationality, since it is much weaker than (a). We are only 
required to avoid certain attitudes, not forming new ones. I am not sure however, whether this 
requirement is one that we should accept. For if we do, then we might ask why there should 
not also be a requirement which tells us to avoid options that are forbidden by a standard, 
such that certain actions would be rationally forbidden. But in that case, some options could 
be rationally eligible and rationally forbidden at the same time (if the option was made 
eligible by one standard and forbidden by another), and so we would again have an incoherent 
conception of rationality. This might tempt us into saying that rationality doesn’t have 
anything to do with the choice of action, that there is no such thing as practical rationality. Yet 
the underlying thought behind eligibility is that if we are to be rational, then the action that we 
choose must somehow be supported by a conclusive reason or an ought fact. We cannot 
rationally act in a way that is disconnected from the standards and the reasoning that result in 
the discovery of their requirements. That an option must be supported by an ought or reason is 
what lies behind the notion of rational eligibility. We cannot rationally choose options that are 
not so supported. 
 
On the classical conception then, choice is not determined by what is the best option or any 
other normative fact. Rather, the classical conception, in Raz’s words, “regards typical 
choices and actions as determined by a will that is informed and constrained by reason but 
plays an autonomous role in action”70. The will is of course a very elusive concept, and Raz 
does not give any thorough analysis of its nature or how it works. The only attempt he gives is 
by saying that “the will is the ability to choose and perform intentional actions. We exercise 
our will when we endorse the verdict or reason that we must perform an action, and we do so, 
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whether willingly, reluctantly, or regretting the need, etc.71” Yet it is also an important 
concept. However slippery it might be, there should be no denying that there is a need for it. 
Leave aside pluralism for a moment and consider a case where you have to choose between 
two options that are equally good. In this case, even the monist would have to say that reason 
has run its course and that all that remains is for the agent to simply choose one of the options. 
This case is parallel to the pluralist’s case, except that in the pluralist’s case, what we are 
dealing with are usually not situations where we are confronted with options that are equally 
good, but with choices that are incommensurable. That is, none of the options are better than 
the other, nor are they equally good (at least not in an unqualified sense). The case is parallel 
in the sense that in both cases has reason discovered a set of eligible options, but has then run 
its course. There is nothing more for rationality to do. 
 
But while there may be nothing more for rationality to do, there may be more for other 
standards to do. We should not conclude that since there is nothing more for rationality to do, 
what we have before us is simply a case of “picking and choosing”. I just said that choice 
between incommensurates is not a choice between options that are equally good, and it isn’t 
the case that when we have to choose between two incommensurates each choice is equally 
justified (or unjustified). Unlike cases of “equal goodness”, each incommensurate option is 
supported by an ought fact or a conclusive reason. We cannot say that it does not matter 
which option I choose, since it does. Morally, for instance, we ought to choose one action, 
while prudentially we ought to choose the other action. What we should say is rather that each 
of the options are justified in different ways, and I shall have more to say about this in chapter 
3. This means that although rationality might not determine choice, other standards might. It 
seems to me that when morality requires something of you, it also requires you to intend that 
thing. The same thing probably goes for prudence and possibly (but not necessarily) the other 
standards. So there might be many different (a)-like requirements embedded within the 
various standards. What does the work then, in the choice of action, is not so much rationality 
as morality, prudence, and the others72. But although there is a sense in which the standards 
determine choice, it is not the sense that the rationalist wants. For there are still many options 
that are determined by the standards, many options that are eligible, and none that is best or 
equally good in some neutral way. Rationally, there is still a tough choice that is left to the 
will. Morally, there is not, and prudentially there is not.  
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
72 Although rationality may do some work. It requires you not to intend actions that are ineligible by reasons. 
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 What this means is that if you are a rational person, then the choice is indetermined by 
rational reasons. But if you are a moral person, then the choice might be determined. This 
alternative conception should make us ask why philosophers like Broome and Wedgwood 
seems so insistent in the first place on the thought that it should be rationality that should 
decide our choices. Why have so many philosophers throughout the ages taken rationality as 
their starting point in practical philosophy? Rationality, I believe, is most naturally understood 
as a standard that is concerned with avoiding contradictions in one’s own mental attitudes. 
Why should we believe that these concerns will get us anywhere in deciding what to do? 
Surely, there must be more worldly and practical starting points for practical philosophy. 
 
For enlightened moral persons then, the choice of action is set. This choice may in some cases 
be different from the prudential person’s choice. Such possibilities for divergence in what 
option is required naturally makes the choice of morality or prudence very important. Ruth 
Chang has called Raz’s proposal a “quasi-existentialist” view of justified choice73. This 
description is in a sense appropriate in that the choice of whether to be moral or prudent is a 
choice that has important consequences for the sort of person that one becomes. But on the 
other hand, it is not existentialist in the sense that the fact of who I want to be determines or 
ultimately justifies (in any unqualified sense) the choice. It would be false to describe the 
situation as a case of a choice of whom I want to be, since we are not dealing with the 
question of what I most want. It is rather a question of what I will become. This question is 
important, but is of no help in deliberation. At least it is of no help in a way that is not 
idiosyncratic. Perhaps prudence or some other standard tells you to choose the option that you 
most want, but that would not settle choice in a neutral way. This means that we should not 
understand the choice between incommensurates as solved (simpliciter) by wants, feelings, or 
similar things. The choice is only solved when we reason from, and embrace the conclusions 
of, one of the standards that make a requirement upon us, and the only way we can do this is 
simply by wilfully choosing. Even then, there will be senses where we have chosen the wrong 
thing, for although we have chosen and embraced one of the requirements, the other standards 
continue to apply to us. Practical reasoning is not as simple as the rationalist would have us 
believe. 
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 2.5 Positive Considerations 
In the last sections, I have been occupied with answering some concerns and objections 
against normative pluralism. By meeting these objections, I have tried to show that normative 
pluralism is a consistent theory. If the theory is consistent and reasonable, that means it should 
be considered as a real candidate for understanding the nature of normativity. I will now try to 
provide some more positive considerations in favour of accepting the theory. Some arguments 
in favour of the theory have already been given implicitly in the preceding sections as I have 
also tried to establish it as a reasonable alternative. In the following pages, I will spell out 
some additional positive arguments. None of these arguments are proofs. As I explained in 
1.2, I do not think that it is plausible that any theory of normativity can be proven. But 
although none of the positive considerations are sufficient in themselves, I believe that they 
together show normative pluralism to offer a better account of normativity than normative 
monism. 
 
The considerations presented below can more or less be divided into two sorts. The first kind 
is various phenomenological considerations. These can be understood as intuitions that we 
may have and that can serve as a kind of evidence for the theory. While these intuitions 
cannot prove the theory in any way, they can serve to give it a certain prima facie validity. If 
the theory coheres with our intuitions, that could be a reason to embrace it. The second kind 
of considerations is of a more philosophical character. Rather than focusing on our immediate 
basic intuitions, these take into account how well the theory fits into a more general 
philosophical framework. The theory’s implications (or lack of implications) will help 
determine its philosophical soundness. 
 
 
2.5.1 Normative Talk 
Although the discussion so far has been rather technical and there have been much 
philosophical jargon, I none the less believe that the contents of the theory of normative 
pluralism might coincide rather well with common thought and speech about normativity. The 
adverbial qualifications of oughts and reasons that I have advocated here is not a 
philosophical invention. It is quite common in ordinary talk to hear oughts and reasons 
qualified in this way. It might be said for instance that ‘you morally ought to do this’ or ‘there 
is a legal reason against that’. Of course, we also often hear the normative concepts used in an 
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unqualified manner, so this might not seem like much evidence. However, we will also be 
able to find situations where such propositions are uttered as ‘it is true that you morally ought 
not to do that, but rationally you should do it’ (rationally here might refer to what I have 
called prudence). Both kinds of requirements here seem to be regarded as true even though 
they entail a practical conflict. What is more, these kinds of utterances might be offered as 
advice. Even though it is recognized that you morally ought not to do this thing, you are urged 
to do it because you rationally or prudentially ought to. This seems to presuppose normative 
pluralism. 
 
One might reply that it is equally, or even more common, to hear such things as ‘although you 
rationally ought to do it, you ought not really to do it’. The explanation for such a statement 
can be held to be that although the criteria of rationality or prudence require you to ϕ, all 
things considered you ought not to ϕ. Such an explanation can deny that rational oughts are 
genuine oughts and that all things considered we ought to do the moral thing. This might be a 
plausible interpretation, but we should keep in mind that the utterance is perfectly consistent 
with normative pluralism. Since you morally ought to not ϕ, then it is true that you ought (in a 
sense) not to ϕ. So, normative pluralism can accommodate this talk equally well. Still, it 
might be argued that in such talk a sort of primacy is given to the moral ought such that we 
could say that the moral ought is the only genuine ought. There is probably some truth to this. 
In situations of apparent practical conflict it seems more common to hear advice be given in 
favour of morality. I think that the reason for this is that the word ‘ought’ in common talk is 
often reserved for morality74. Morality is a standard that governs and regulates public life, so 
it is a natural one to use in intersubjective dialogue. There might also be strong prudential 
reasons to adopt morality as the only standard to be used in public reasoning, since each of us 
usually have an interest in that other people behave morally. But we should also recognize the 
fact that it seems like ‘ought’ is not always reserved in this manner. A friend might some 
times advise the other to act in accordance with his self-interest and not in accordance with 
morality, and he often will say and believe that you ought to act in this way. This kind of 
advise is not something that a normative monist can explain unless he either assumes that it is 
true that you sometimes all things considered really ought to act in such an egoistic way, or 
that the speaker is cognitively confused. The first option is, I think, very unattractive. The 
                                                 
74 This is not quite true as we often use the word ’ought’ in means-ends talk. However, as soon as this kind of 
talk comes into conflict with moral requirements, this ought often give way to the moral ought. 
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second option is a possibility, but the normative pluralist is able to give a much more 
charitable interpretation of this speaker. 
 
 
2.5.2 Practical Dilemmas 
We have seen that John Broome denies the existence of deontic conflicts, and thus the 
possibility of practical dilemmas. In a given situation it follows that all things considered, 
either there is nothing you ought, or there is just one thing you ought. I have said that his 
argument against the existence of deontic conflicts was the most challenging counter-
argument to normative pluralism, but that it failed because in the end it did not really apply 
because Broome’s requirement (a) does not and cannot be substituted with a similar 
requirement governing adverbial oughts. However, requirement (a) does apply if we assume 
normative monism. It seems then that the normative monist must be committed to denying the 
existence of deontic conflict as long as he accepts requirement (a), or else he will end up with 
an incoherent conception of rationality. Requirement (a) is, as I have said, a plausible 
requirement of rationality, so it does really seem like there is no way for a monist to argue for 
the possibility of practical dilemmas.  
 
Yet it is a fact that many philosophers have argued in favour of dilemmas without assuming 
any kind of normative pluralism. There have been a large debate around the question of the 
existence of moral dilemmas, and much of the debate has been mostly independent of the 
questions raised in this thesis75. I do not think it is unreasonable to claim that the reason why 
many have defended the existence of dilemmas is that there is a certain intuition of their 
existence, and that it may be quite common. Bernard Williams writes: 
 
It seems to me a fundamental criticism of many ethical theories that their accounts of moral conflict and 
its resolution do not do justice to the facts of regret and related considerations: basically because they 
eliminate from the scene the ought that is not acted upon. A structure appropriate to conflicts of beliefs 
is projected on to the moral case. […] Such an approach must be inherent in purely cognitive accounts 
of the matter; since it is just a question of which of the conflicting ought statements is true, and they 
                                                 
75 See Christopher W. Gowans, ”The Debate on Moral Dilemmas”, in Moral Dilemmas (Ed. Christopher W. 
Gowans), (New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) for a general introduction to the debate. The 
debate that Gowans refers to occurred before the recent surge in the philosophy of normativity, however. 
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cannot both be true, to decide correctly between them must be to rid of error with respect to the 
other…76  
 
In this passage Williams criticizes the rationalist conception of human agency (see 2.4.3) for 
committing itself to denying what seem to be facts, namely moral conflicts. The defender of 
the existence of dilemmas is normally convinced by an intuition similar to this. The thought is 
that denying their existence seems unrealistic relative to the real practical choices we can and 
do confront in the actual world. Not only can practical decisions be hard, but in some cases it 
even seems as if we are under real conflicting obligations. Examples of these cases abound in 
both literature and moral philosophy, and I shall not bother to repeat them here. The intuition 
behind this feeling may or may not be true, but in any case, I believe it warrants a serious 
response. The trouble is that it appears like opponents of dilemmas often start out by 
assuming that they cannot exist. For instance, many Kantians and Utilitarians start out with 
some formal philosophical views on practical and moral reasoning which can seem to commit 
them to denying dilemmas77. John Broome is another example. Broome denies the existence 
of dilemmas on what can seem as very formal grounds. The problem with these responses is 
that they don’t take the intuition behind the existence of dilemmas seriously enough. The way 
that many defenders of dilemmas come to accept their existence is by carefully looking at the 
norms (moral and otherwise) that we actually have and that actually appears justified, and 
then seeing that they actually do conflict. There is then an interpretation of the real world and 
the normative concerns we do have before any philosophical theory is built. This argument for 
dilemmas is somewhat unfair to Broome however, for Broome does not base his claims solely 
on formal philosophical considerations, but also on an interpretation of rationality. But 
although Broome has done an impressive study of rationality, he has not made the same effort 
of interpreting the demands of morality (or any other standards). I believe that this is where 
Broome goes wrong, and I also believe that this is the best way to come to see the plausibility 
of normative pluralism. No proofs can be offered, but it is the best theory of the normative 
reality that we live in. 
 
Traditionally, the defenders of dilemmas have not assumed anything like normative pluralism, 
and has normally only been concerned with the existence of moral dilemmas. In doing this 
                                                 
76 Bernard Williams, ”Ethical Consistency”, in Moral Dilemmas, p. 125. Notice the similarity between Williams’ 
thought here and the intuitions behind normative pluralism. Williams does not endorse anything like normative 
pluralism, but some of the intuitions are obviously shared. Normative pluralism is a way to embrace William’s 
intuition while retaining cognitivism. 
77 Gowans, op. cit., pp. 4-10. 
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they have encountered certain problems – particularly in relation to deontic logic. It seems as 
if dilemmas have not been consistent with certain commonly accepted principles of deontic 
logic, most importantly the agglomeration principle (if a person ought to do one thing and 
ought to do another thing, then the person ought to do both things), and the “ought implies 
can”-principle (if a person ought to do something, then the person can do that thing)78. 
Dilemmas seem to be inconsistent with the conjunction of these two principles because a 
dilemma postulates that you ought to do two conflicting things. Hence, in accordance with the 
agglomeration principle, you ought to do both, and according to “ought implies can”, you can 
do both, but in a dilemma, you can’t do both. A common response have been to reject one of 
the two principles as genuine deontic principles79, or even to reject the whole analogy to 
alethic modal logic that deontic logic seems to be built on80. These responses are fair because 
deontic logic has always been perplexing and are not imbued with the same level of 
confidence as the principles of propositional and predicate logic81. But having a functioning 
system of deontic logic would of course be an advantage, and normative pluralism can 
provide us with a way to make dilemmas consistent with deontic logic. The way we can do 
this is to hold the basic premise that there are many types of ought – that each ought is 
relativized to some standard, that is, adverbially modified – such that what we operate with 
are not simple ‘oughts’, but ‘moral oughts’, ‘prudential oughts’, and so on. This means that 
while the agglomeration principle and the “ought implies can”-principle could be valid and 
apply between simple oughts (O), they do not necessarily apply between different types of 
oughts. We could accept an agglomeration of two moral oughts perhaps, but not between 
oughts of different types. This would involve introducing new deontic operators, so it would 
not leave deontic logic untouched, but we would not have to reject its principles.  
 
The consistency is somewhat fragile however, as it relocates the dilemmas from being moral 
dilemmas to being practical dilemmas. The dilemmas, if the solution is to work, must not take 
place within the normative standards, but between them. There could be no conflict between 
moral oughts82, but there could be conflict between a moral ought and a prudential ought. I do 
not think such a relocation would be unreasonable. Many considerations which are often 
taken to be moral considerations might perhaps best be interpreted as other kinds of 
                                                 
78 Ibid., p. 20. 
79 Bernard Williams, for instance, rejects the agglomeration principle. See Williams, op. cit., p. 132. 
80 Gowans, op. cit., p. 23. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Fortunately, this may not be entirely true, as there possibly could be conflicts between superogatory demands. 
What is to be denied are only conflict between ”perfect duties”. 
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considerations. For instance, duties to one’s own happiness could perhaps be better 
understood as prudential considerations. Still, I do not want to insist on this point. It could 
well turn out that after a proper reflection on the moral standard, we should come to believe 
that there are moral dilemmas. Normative pluralism allows for this too. What we should note 
is that there are many reasons to believe in the existence of practical dilemmas (moral or not), 
and normative pluralism offers the best way to accommodate them. It provides a way for 
utilitarians, deontologists, and defenders of standard deontic logic to accept the existence of 
practical dilemmas while denying that they are moral in character. It is likewise perfectly 
consistent with the existence of moral dilemmas. And last but not least, it offers a way for all 




One of the considerations that have appeared as arguments for the existence of dilemmas is 
the thought that dilemmas can explain the intuition that reasons can retain their full force even 
when they are defeated. Even when the “right” choice is made, it is thought that there may be 
a certain “moral remainder” or “residual duties”. In situations of conflict then, there can be 
reasons for having a certain “regret” for the option we did not choose to act upon. Jonathan 
Dancy seems to suggest that a moral theory must be required to be able to explain this 
phenomenon83. He mentions that it is possible for a moral theory to have difficulties with this, 
for instance with a theory which was too simply additive, such that regrettable features only 
diminish the rightness of the best action. Once the diminishing has been taken into account, 
there would be no further way in which we can see the action as regrettable for having those 
features84. In discussing how to accommodate the phenomenon of regret, Dancy takes the 
passage of Bernard Williams that I quoted in the last section as his point of departure. 
Williams said that many theories was unable to do justice to the fact of regret because they 
eliminate from the scene the ought that was not acted upon. Dancy then goes on to give his 
explanation of regret, but in the end he admits that on his theory 
 
…it now seems implausible to suppose that the defeated reasons remain present as oughts ; instead they 
remain as reasons. On the picture I have ended up with there really seems […] to be only one ought, 
which attaches itself to and emerges from the most persuasive story one can tell about the 
circumstances. […] And in ordinary cases of conflict only one of them can be admitted, in the final 
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decision. So in ridding oneself of the claims of one, one is ridding oneself of error; for one is rejecting 
the claim of one picture to be the right way of seeing the situation. But one is not in error in supposing 
that the features salient in the defeated picture are salient, since they will be salient also in the defeating 
picture. So those features, as I said, remain as reasons but not quite as oughts. So in a sense, I claim both 
to have answered Williams’ question and to have rejected the terms in which it was posed.85 
 
There is nothing very wrong in what Dancy is doing here. But we can see that while there is a 
sense in which Dancy can explain a certain kind of normative remainder, he cannot keep to 
the original intuition that was expressed by Williams. It is quite obvious that all theories intent 
on explaining regret and that is unable to accommodate several conflicting oughts is forced to 
weaken Williams’ intuition. Normative pluralism, on the other hand, can retain it in full force. 
 
Another point in relation to regret is that one may give good arguments in favour of the case 
that regret is always irrational in some sense. These arguments can undermine certain 
explanations of regret, because certain positions will take this to mean that one ought not to 
have regret. Bernard Williams says that in this case “we must rather admit that an admirable 
moral agent is one who on occasion is irrational”, and that this possibility may well be 
correct86. Normative pluralism has no problem with this because it can accept that while we 
for instance rationally ought not to have regret, we morally ought to.  
 
 
2.5.4 The Normativity of Rationality 
Niko Kolodny argues that rationality is not normative. One reason for this is that for any 
particular case, he cannot show that there must be a reason for you to conform to the 
requirements of rationality. Kolodny denies that “a nonreductionist who seeks to explain the 
normativity of rationality in terms of the normativity of reasons can give it. The 
nonreductionist believes that an answer to the question ‘Why ought I to X?’ must offer a 
substantive reason for X-ing, e.g., that X-ing would prevent suffering, or advance the frontiers 
of knowledge”87. Broome is more careful in his conclusions, but seem to express the same 
idea when he says that he “can find no grounds for thinking that rationality is normative. If 
there are grounds, I do not know them”88. The thought behind these remarks seem to be that it 
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88 Broome, op. cit., p. 107. See also Broome, John, ”Is Rationality Normative?” (forthcoming in Disputatio), 
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is plausible that there are cases where you ought not to conform to the rational requirements. 
Broome says that for all he knows, “rationality may not be normative. Often when rationality 
requires you to F, you have a reason to F, but I have to assume this is not necessarily so”89. I 
would think that this conclusion appears because both these writers are normative monists. 
For them, requirements are normative insofar as they are something that we ought simpliciter, 
and this is not necessarily the case for rational requirements. It is thought that in some cases, 
other considerations could outweigh whatever reason we have for behaving rationally, and so 
the requirements of rationality could not express any kind of categorical imperative. In some 
cases, they seem to say that there might even be no reason for conforming to rationality. I am 
not quite sure why they make this latter claim, but I would think what they mean could 
perhaps be that in some cases, ultimately there is no conclusive reason to be rational; that is, 
all things considered you ought not to be rational. 
 
Although Broome’s conclusion is sceptical towards the idea that rationality is normative, he 
never the less admits that it seems intuitively plausible that it actually is normative in some 
sense90. Kolodny also seem to admit this intuition, but he offers what he calls the 
“transparency account” to explain how rational requirements can always seem normative from 
within, yet without this normativity actually being the case91. Kolodny may or may not be 
right about this, but although he might succeed in explaining why we have the intuition that 
rationality is normative, he is none the less forced to say that the intuition is false. Normative 
pluralism offers a way of retaining the truth in this intuition. If we reject Kolodny’s monism, 
then we are not forced to justify the requirements of rationality in terms of any ought 
simpliciter. We do not have to justify them by reference to conclusive reasons in the same 
sense that Kolodny has to. It will be sufficient to point to all the rational reasons that exist and 
that requires us conform to the requirements. Through rational considerations, we can 
presumably reach an all things considered judgement that we rationally ought to conform, and 
this is enough to make the requirements normative. We do not have to, and indeed cannot (in 
any neutral way), reach justifications of the requirements by means of oughts or conclusive 
reasons simpliciter. I cannot prove here that the requirements of rationality are normative, 
because that would depend on what we take to be the rational requirements and what the 
criteria that constitutes the standard of rationality would be, and that would mean offering a 
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substantive theory of rationality, which is something that is well beyond the scope of this 
thesis. But in any case, it would be plausible to presume that this can be done, and this 
supports an intuitive conclusion that Broome and Kolodny have been unable to reach. 
 
 
2.5.5 Weakness of the Will 
One argument that I said was not made explicitly by Wedgwood, but that was a reasonable 
argument that could be inferred from the other things he said, was connected with weakness 
of the will (akrasia). Weakness of the will is defined by Wedgwood as “willingly failing to do 
something that you judge you ought to do”92 This means that if you judge that you ought to ϕ, 
yet you do not intend to ϕ, you are being akratic, and therefore irrational. An argument can 
thus be made that if we assume normative pluralism, such that we can believe that there are 
many oughts (some of which are incompatible) that we ought to intend, we would be akratic – 
and therefore irrational – more or less all the time. This is not an intuitive conclusion. Yet this 
argument can be dispelled in the same way as Broome’s proof and the proofs from deontic 
logic. The problem with these arguments is that they all use the ‘ought all things considered’-
concept as part of their proofs. Just as requirement (a) does not apply to adverbial oughts, 
neither does Wedgwood’s definition of akrasia, since the ought that figures in the definition is 
the monistic ‘ought all things considered’.  
 
But stopping at this point would leave us in an unhappy situation, for since we do believe in 
cases of weakness of will, we want to have a definition that does apply, and we are at this 
point left without one. Wedgwood’s definition is not an unusual definition, and it is a 
plausible one, it can be claimed. A new definition, it seems, have to be weaker than the 
former. At least we cannot say that for all types of oughts that I judge apply to me, I would be 
akratic if I fail to intend them. That would again leave us with the problem of constant 
irrationality. But before I move on to an attempt at a weaker definition, let me first try to 
argue that we have reason in any case to believe that Wedgwood’s definition is too strong. 
The reason is that it is very difficult to see how Wedgwood’s proposal could accommodate 
demanding theories of what we ought. For instance, many types of utilitarianism claims that 
we ought to maximize total happiness, and this can be at a great expense to our own 
happiness. If we assume utilitarianism to be true, or just that a set of people believe that it is 
                                                 
92 Wedgwood, op. cit., p. 25. 
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true, we would never the less not expect the relevant agents to do what they believe they 
ought, because it is simply so demanding. We would be forced to say that the agents in 
question are behaving irrationally. This may not seem entirely implausible, and in any case 
there might be good reasons not to believe in such demanding theories. But the point is that if 
we accept Wedgwood’s proposal, we should expect relatively large amounts of irrationality. 
Remember for example that most of the world is religious, and many believe that they are 
under quite demanding requirements. They may perhaps be ‘sinners’, but should we 
necessarily call them irrational when they do not comply with these requirements? 
 
I think that a better understanding of weakness of the will should start with recognizing a 
plurality of oughts, and that we most of the time are under various obligations of different 
natures. It is simply not possible to do all the things that we judge we ought to do. The cases 
where we could be said to be weak of will should rather be cases where we willingly fail to 
intend what we judge we ought, and not because we intend another thing we judge we ought. 
That is, we have weakness of will when we act contrary to what we judge we ought, and not 
for the sake of another ought. With this definition, we could limit weakness of will to cases 
like addiction, procrastination, and impulses. I can find no reason, no ought fact, that supports 
my continued smoking. Yet I continue to smoke. Or I am walking from point A to point B, 
knowing that I ought to get there as soon as I can, yet I impulsively (for no reason) stop to 
play with a twig. We would then be able to recognize these familiar cases of weakness of will 
as genuine akrasia, and at the same time, by recognizing the plurality of oughts, we could 
give a much more charitable interpretation of those who believe they are under demanding 
requirements of what they ought. The utilitarian or the religious man could then be said to 
judge that they morally ought to act in the demanding way, but prudentially they ought not to 
(without this being any kind of moral excuse). Their acting prudentially would then be able to 
make us preserve their rationality. 
 
 
2.5.6 Rules and Purity 
Another way in which it seems like the demands of stringent theories like Kantianism and 
utilitarianism is excluded out of general philosophical reasons is, as I have mentioned, 
because of their potential algorithm-like form. Some versions of these moral theories could be 
interpreted as being algorithmic. As I explained in 2.2.2, accepting algorithmical normative 
theories might be problematic for normative monists. I said that if we were to try to codify 
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how one ought to act (all things considered), one might well come to see that there are so 
many kinds of reasons and so many different considerations to make (perhaps in direct 
contradiction), that the project could soon come to be thought impossible. Normative 
pluralism does not imply that the normative standards are algorithmic, but leaves it open as a 
theoretical possibility because the various standards seem to isolate the different types of 
reasons that we have. Thus normative pluralism is yet again philosophically neutral on a point 
where it seems that normative monism cannot manage to be. Again, certain types of strong 
normative theories are able to be accommodated. 
 
This neutrality can be argued to come at a certain expense. For the way in which the theory is 
able to accommodate all these strong theories is, as I said, by isolating considerations93. One 
may have an intuition that considerations are not isolated in this manner. This goes back to the 
discussion about the incommensurability of reasons. On this point I have said that there seems 
to exist no plausible way in which the various types of reasons can be generally weighed 
against each other in any neutral way. I shall not repeat the argument. What I would instead 
like to propose is that the isolation in question is not in fact a drawback, but an advantage. 
This is not just because there is an epistemic problem about how to weigh different types of 
considerations, but because it allows a certain purity that is otherwise difficult to achieve. If 
we insist on the possibility of weighing and try to accommodate all the types of considerations 
in determining what we ought, then everything becomes relevant. This point was one of my 
motivations for first trying to develop the theory that have been presented here, and the point 
is first and foremost a moral point. If what fundamentally matters is what we ought all things 
considered – taking all considerations into account – then it seems like morality may have to 
compromise, and the compromise will have to be because of other nonmoral reasons. Perhaps 
even selfish reasons. Morality, it seems to me, must have a stronger normative status than 
that.  
 
John Broome discusses this point. In his discussion of whether adverbial oughts are truly 
normative, he mentions the possibility that in the particular case of morality it might perhaps 
express a genuine ought. He says that “it may be that the conflicts between requirements of 
morality and other requirements are always resolved in favour of morality. Or it may be that 
                                                 
93 Yet we should note that the isolation in question need not be total. One can consider egoistic reasons in moral 
reasoning for example, but these reasons will probably not have any moral weight. One could perhaps also 




morality subsumes other requirements in some way. That is to say, it may be that necessarily 
you ought to do as morality requires”94. Broome does not endorse this conclusion tough, since 
it would take a substantive argument to show that this is so, and in any case it isn’t part of the 
meaning of ‘morally ought’ that it implies ‘ought all things considered’. The possibility he 
never the less mentions here is the possibility that morality and the ought all things considered 
coincides. If this could be argued, it would be morally sympathetic, but if we did argue in this 
way, we would be forced to deny the normativity of rationality, prudence, and all the other 
standards, unless we could at the same time show that morality also coincides with these, and 
the latter conclusion seems highly implausible. Intuitively, we want to say that rationality is 
normative, and I think that the same goes for all the rest. Again, we could try to argue that 
morality and rationality coincides, but I would think that this would leave us with a very 
unnatural way of understanding the requirements of morality, rationality, or both. Rationality 
is most naturally understood as being concerned about evidential relations for example, while 
morality is most naturally understood as concern for the welfare of other people. And even if 
we do manage to make these two standards coincide, there will probably be more standards 
that intuitively seem normative. Normative pluralism is the only way in which we can 
accommodate every kind of consideration without compromising their nature. 
 
 
2.6 A Further Issue: What Standards Are There? 
Two natural questions which arises once one has admitted the existence of a plurality of 
normative concepts is the question of how many concepts there are, and which normative 
concepts actually do exist. In arguing in favour of multiple oughts in this chapter, I have 
mentioned several candidates, for instance the moral, prudential, rational, and legal ought. I 
have not given any substantive argument to show that any of these are in fact normative. My 
main concern in this chapter has been to show the possibility and desirability of admitting 
more than one normative concept95. There is then the further question of whether each of the 
candidates I have mentioned are genuinely normative, and whether there are additional 
standards from the ones I have mentioned. These questions are connected with the difficult 
question of what normativity entails, and answering this could give rise to several complex 
metaphysical issues.  
 
                                                 
94 Broome, Ibid., p. 21. 
95 Although in doing so I have drawn on the intuitions that both moral oughts and rational oughts are normative. 
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I will not try to provide a complete specification of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
achieving normative status. Nor will I try to provide a complete list of what normative 
concepts there are. Yet, I will attempt in this section to provide some illumination on the 
issue.  
 
One could for instance ask whether archery is normative. Archery requires using a bow, 
which is an action. It does not seem right, however, to say that this is a normative 
requirement. The requirement should be thought of as merely the claim that without using a 
bow, it is impossible to be doing archery. This should be seen as just a factual claim. Now 
consider Kolodny’s example of chess-oughts. One could say that one ought not to move one’s 
pawn backwards, or one could say that the rules of chess require you to not move your pawn 
backwards. Kolodny says that these oughts are not normative, but only “classificatory”. These 
oughts say that unless you follow the rules of chess you do not count as playing chess. Thus, 
moving your pawn backwards does not count as playing chess. This classificatory ought is 
also just a factual ought, Kolodny seems to think. Yet, I think it is a genuine question whether 
this is so. This depends on how we interpret the rules of chess. If it is plausible to interpret the 
rules as a set of prohibitions, then I think we would have to grant those rules a normative 
status. One way to argue in favour of understanding them as prohibitions is to argue for the 
possibility of cheating at chess96. If we can cheat, that is perform illegal moves, yet still be 
playing chess, then our understanding of the rules would seem to have to drift towards the 
normative. Broome mentions a similar example when he says that Catholicism requires us not 
to wear condoms. He says that there is a genuine question whether this requirement is 
normative. I can agree with that it is a question, but in this case it seems even clearer to me 
than in the chess-case that the requirement is normative. We are certainly speaking of 
prohibitions here. Lastly, we have moral oughts, like the requirement that you should not 
murder this or that innocent person. This claim, I believe, must be normative. It seems to be 
our very reference for determining what other requirements are normative. If moral oughts are 
not normative, then it doesn’t seem like anything is. 
 
What we have here is a range of types of oughts or requirements, starting from what is 
certainly not normative (archery) to what certainly is normative (morality). In between there 
are a number of types of requirements that we can ask whether are normative or not. It is an 
                                                 




open question whether chess rules, Catholicism, rationality, or the law are normative. 
Whether they are depend on our particular theories about these particular standards. For that 
reason, I cannot give a list of how many normative standards there are, since that number 
depends on our theories, and I am not going to discuss those theories here97. I did suggest 
something which could help determine the possible normativity of standards however. I said 
that their normative status seem to depend on whether we can interpret their requirement as 
prohibitions. Of course, I did not mean to say that normativity is only entailed by prohibitions. 
Other normative concepts can also do that, for instance duties or permissions. Whether these 
concepts can be defined non-circularly or whether they are primitive is uncertain, but in any 
case it does not matter as long as I am able to pick out instances of oughts or requirements 
that are clearly normative. Morality is clearly normative in a way that archery is clearly not, 
and whether the other standards are normative depends on whether they require in the same 
way that morality does. 
 
I shall end this section by making a few suggestions about how these standards can be said to 
exist. In principle, it seems that normative pluralism admits the existence of a great number of 
bizarre standards, and that they are each given a strong normative status. It may seem as if 
every possible action is required by some standard or other. However, I want to say that a 
normative standard does not exist just because we can imagine it to exist. Even though we can 
imagine some crazy standard requiring some crazy action doesn’t mean that this standard 
exists and that we truly ought to perform that crazy action. Saying that a standard exists is 
saying something more than that we can imagine it.  
 
This seems to bring us into deep metaphysical waters regarding how norms can be thought to 
exist. I have nothing original to say on this matter and neither is it a part of this thesis, but I 
still want to say something about it. This is because I want to show how not every possible 
standard can be a real normative standard, and because I think it helps to show how there can 
be more than one standard.  
 
The account I am going to rely on is an account offered by Joseph Raz98. Raz is trying to offer 
a theory on the existence of values. Raz is a value pluralist, and so he is interested in showing 
                                                 
97 The number also depends on how the various standards are interrelated. For instance, if I believe that morality 
is identical with Catholicism, then the two standards would merge into one. 
98 Raz, Joseph, The Practice of Value, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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that there can come to be multiple values that are incommensurable with each other99. 
Although he is only interested in explaining the existence of values, I see no reason why the 
account he offers could not be used to explain the existence of normative standards the way I 
understand them.  
 
Raz advances the following thesis: 
  
The special social dependence thesis claims that some values exist only if there are (or were) social 
practices sustaining them […] Regarding any value there is in any population a sustaining practice if 
people conduct themselves approximately as they would were they to be aware of it, and if they do so 
out of (an openly avowed) belief that it is worthwhile to conduct themselves as they do (under some 
description or another).100 
 
The precise points of Raz’s definition of a sustaining practice can of course be discussed, but 
the reason he defines it in this way is that he wants to allow that people engaging with them 
may not be aware of the values that their conduct is sustaining, or that they may do so with an 
imperfect knowledge of it101. I see no reason to deny these points although they are not 
essential to my view. However, Raz expresses an important point when he says the following: 
 
The dependence of value on practice that the thesis affirms is not simultaneous and continuous. The 
thesis is that the existence of values depends on the existence of sustaining practices at some point, not 
that that these practices must persist as long as the value does. […] Once they come into being they 
remain in existence even if the sustaining practices die out. They can be known even if exclusively from 
records. They can get forgotten and be rediscovered, and the like. Their meaning may change with time 
[…]  
You can see now why this form of social dependence does not involve social relativism. There is no 
suggestion that what is of value is so only in societies where the value is appreciated, nor that the rights, 
duties, or virtues exist only when recognized. Once a value comes into being, it bears on everything 
without restriction. But its existence has social preconditions.102 
 
By swapping ‘value’ with ‘ought’, ‘requirement’, or ‘standard’, we seem to get a get a neat 
account of the existence of norms that is consistent with pluralism. Some normative standards 
(standards of etiquette would be a natural example) may come into existence through social 
                                                 
99 Ibid., p. 140. 
100 Ibid., pp. 19-20. Raz also advances what he calls the (general) social dependence thesis. I believe that this 
thesis may also be applicable to normative pluralism, but I am not interested in pursuing that point here. 
101 Ibid., p. 20. 
102 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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practices, but once they come to exist they ‘bear on everything without restriction’. Raz’s 
thesis is also weakly enough formulated to allow for the possibility that not every value or 
norm depends on social practices for their existence. That moral requirements apply no matter 
whether the thought of them has ever crossed anyone’s mind may not be an uncommon 
thought. The special dependence thesis may accommodate that some standards do not depend 
for their existence on social preconditions, while being able to claim that other standards do. 
Raz mentions that the special dependence thesis seems to apply primarily to cultural values, 
while many moral values seem not to be subject to it103. In the same way we can say that 
certain standards like morality and rationality are not socially dependent in that way, while 
other standards, like religious standards, standards of etiquette, or the rules of chess are 
socially dependent in such a way. Whether any particular standard is subject to the special 
dependence thesis depends on our specific theory of that standard. But as long as some of the 
possible standards are subject to it, then the number of standards will be limited, and I believe 




In this chapter, I have tried to develop a theory of norms. The theory, which I have named 
normative pluralism, holds that the fundamental normative concept (whether it be ‘ought’ or 
‘reason’), is not homogenous in kind. Rather, there exist many types of oughts (or reasons), 
each making true normative requirements upon us. The explanation of this plurality is that 
oughts (or reasons) are relative to normative standards, such as morality, prudence, or 
rationality. This is reflected in language when we speak of, for instance, ‘moral oughts’ or 
‘moral reasons’, indicating that oughts and reasons are adverbially modified in accordance 
with the normative standard they belong to and that generates them. These different types of 
oughts or reasons are held to be incommensurates, meaning that they can not be weighed 
against each other in a common shared way. Any weighing must use a particular standard as 
its point of reference, and since no standard is privileged, there can be no weighing that is 
normatively neutral in its nature. 
 
As an extension of this, I have argued that there is no ought simpliciter – that is, there is no 
ought that is not relative – as normative monists seem to think. In order to show this, the 
                                                 
103 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
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normative monist must show how seemingly different types of considerations actually can be 
weighed against each other, and show that this kind of weighing is somehow privileged and 
more fundamental than other kinds of weighing. The normative monists I have discussed here 
have not been able to do this. Furthermore, their counter-arguments fail, primarily because 
they base themselves upon requirements of practical reasoning that does not, and cannot, 
apply. This calls for a new analysis of the nature of practical reasoning, and I have tentatively 
accepted what Joseph Raz has called ‘the classical conception of human agency’.  
 
In the end, there is no hard proof for the position I expound. Its ability to convince mainly 
comes from three considerations. First, its ability to accept and explain certain intuitions. 
Second, its coherence in relation to other philosophical theories. Third, its ability to achieve 
coherence with intuitions and theories in a better way than normative monism. The most 
important considerations in its favour are probably that it firstly, can accommodate and 
explain the existence of normative dilemmas; secondly, that it can isolate the different kinds 
of normative reasoning, and thirdly, that it can understand rationality as truly normative. With 
the first point, it can accept and take seriously our feeling of sometimes encountering real 
normative conflicts. With the second point, it can show how many considerations, which we 
take as real considerations, are not relevant in one sense, while they can be in another sense. 
With the third point, it can accept that we in some senses sometimes ought not to be rational, 
while still accepting in another sense that we do, thus maintaining the obvious normative 
status of rationality that some normative monists have been forced to deny. These seem to me 
to be good reasons to accept a plurality of oughts, especially considering the problems faced 














3.0 A Pluralist Approach to Justification 
 
 
In the previous chapter I made an attempt to establish a theory of normativity. I named the 
theory ’normative pluralism’ in order to signify that we were dealing with a multiplicity of 
fundamental normative concepts. In this chapter I will briefly try to draw out some 
implications from this theory that could help illuminate the question ’why follow norms?’. In 
other words, I will try to examine what implications this pluralism of the normative has for 
the justification of norms. I will not try to provide a complete answer to the question. By that I 
mean that I will not say anything about what substantive reasons we actually have for 
following the actual norms we have. Instead I will merely be dealing with what formal 
implications normative pluralism has for justifications. 
 
I shall start by drawing out these implications in 3.1, and I will say a bit about what it means 
for practical philosophy in 3.2. In 3.3 I shall discuss an interesting article by David Brink on 
Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason. By doing this I shall show the contrast between the 
pluralist and the monist view on justification. This discussion will also show some 
problematic points about normative monism, and will further establish the philosophical 
fruitfulness of normative pluralism. 
 
 
3.1 Pluralist Implications for Justification 
The central feature of normative pluralism is the claim that there is a multiplicity of 
fundamental normative concepts – many types of oughts or reasons – which are all true. 
These oughts are derived from various normative standards which are incommensurable with 
each other because they rely on, and are constituted by, different criteria for determining the 
right action. This incommensurability means that they cannot be weighed against each other 
in any common or neutral way, since all such weighing is standard dependent. Since the 
standards ensure that all the derived oughts are true and cannot be weighed against each other, 
there cannot be any appeal to what we ought simpliciter. There cannot be any “super-
standard” or “super-ought” that is somehow privileged with having any absolute priority over 




With normative pluralism then, we can recognize that there must be many different types of 
reasoning, each corresponding to different standards. We can therefore say that there must be 
many different kinds of justification. When we justify a normative conclusion, we must point 
to the criteria and considerations that allow us to hold the conclusion as true, and these are 
standard dependent and also differ from standard to standard. This is the central implication 
from normative pluralism. Furthermore, since justifications come in many types, justifications 
do not proceed from some super-standard. Normative conclusions are not justified by the 
monistic concept of ‘ought all-things-considered’. All we have are the standards, and their 
incommensurability implies that we cannot weigh them non-idiosyncratically, and thus cannot 
reach the monistic justification. The fact that all we have are the various standards and that 
they cannot be weighed against each other does not mean that their conclusions are equally 
good, that is to say, are equally justified. That conclusion presupposes the monist concept and 
is also inconsistent with the definition of incommensurability that we have employed. What it 
means is simply that there are many types of justifications. Each of the normative conclusions 
coming from the various standards are justified in different ways, and are imbued with 
different ‘qualities’, so to speak. A moral justification is different in its nature from a 
prudential justification. 
 
The claims above are simple implications from the content of normative pluralism. Aside 
from what has been shown here, the theory does not hold very special views about the nature 
of justification. Justifications proceed in an ordinary way by showing how the normative 
conclusions follow or are supported by grounds held to be reasons. The difference is merely 
that we hold there to be many types of reasons (which cannot be compared) and that there are 
therefore also many types of justifications.  
 
 
3.1.1 Why Follow Norms? 
We should see then that we can answer the question of why follow norms in many ways. But 
the question itself is not entirely clear, since we need to know what we refer to with the word 
‘norm’. A typical candidate for a norm would be imperative sentences such as “do not steal”. 
But it is doubtful whether we could identify such sentences with norms since they also have 
other functions, like requests and warnings104. Another aspect of such imperatives is that they 
                                                 
104 Se von Wright, Georg Henrik, Norm and Action, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 96. 
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may not seem to have any truth value. It seems however that all norms can be formulated in 
term of deontic concepts105. “You ought not to steal” might therefore be a better example of a 
norm. We are thus dealing with propositions about what someone ought. The action that is 
required might be called the content of the norm. 
 
The question ‘why follow norms?’ can also seem to be phrased in such a way that it 
presupposes that there are reasons to follow norms, perhaps necessarily so. Take the directive 
“break your promises whenever you gain from it”. We might be tempted to say that you ought 
not to break your promises in such a way, and that there is no reason to do so. Therefore, we 
might conclude, the directive cannot express a real norm. The sentence only has the 
appearance of being a norm. The question is here raised whether normative ought-
propositions have to be true in order to be a real norm. If they must be true, then it follows 
that for every norm, there must be a reason to follow it. 
 
Let us understand norms to be the ought-conclusions that can be derived from the criteria of 
the normative standards. If we understand the concept of ‘norm’ in this way, certain things 
follow. Firstly, for every norm, there must necessarily be some conclusive reason to follow it. 
Each norm is already justified by the criteria of some standard when it comes into existence. 
If there wasn’t such a reason, then it does not seem as if it would have been possible to derive 
the ought in the first place. The oughts that can be derived are meant to express facts. 
Secondly, the way in which the norm is justified is also already given. There cannot be any 
non-relativized ought facts, so the norms we have must express a particular sense of the 
concept of ‘ought’ which would signify by what criteria it was justified.  
 
In what way then, can we say that we can answer the question of why follow norms in many 
ways? It seems as if there is only one answer to the question of why follow a particular norm, 
since its justification is already given by the sense of the ought that figures in the norm. This 
latter conclusion is true. What we can rather say is that the content of the norm can be thought 
to be able to be justified in many different ways. The action that a particular norm requires 
can also be required by other standards. This means that for any imperative sentence that 
could figure in a norm, it might be true in many different ways that we ought to comply with 
them. Another way in which we can make sense of the thought that norms can be justified in 
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many different ways, turns on the fact that norms can be phrased ambiguously. We can say 
that ‘you ought not to betray your friends’ and hold this to express a true norm. In this 
sentence the sense of the ought has not been specified, and although we may know that the 
sentence expresses a norm, it might be epistemologically unclear what kind of norm it is. We 
may not know by what standard it has been derived. In such a case, we might find that both 
prudentially and morally it might be true that you ought not to betray your friends. Morally, it 
might be that you ought not to betray your friends because that would mean taking an unfair 
advantage of the trust that they have put in you; and prudentially it might be that your 
happiness or utility is best served in the long run by not ruining your friendships. So although 
a particular well-specified norm can only be justified in one way, there are still two other 
senses in which norms can be justified in many ways. 
 
Before moving on I should mention that I use the concept of ‘norm’ in a technical way. It is 
not necessarily fitting as a general definition of the word. For instance, it may be doubted 
whether we have norms regulating token actions, something which is a possibility on the 
account I have given. Norms are often taken only to be general rules governing types of 
actions, perhaps a bit similar to “imperfect duties”. But my aim here is not to give an account 
of how the word is used in everyday speech106. 
 
 
3.2 Some Implications for Practical Philosophy 
Normative pluralism has important implications for the way we should understand the tasks of 
practical philosophy. These implications do not mean any radical transformation of 
philosophy. A theory of normativity must also charitably account for the way we do 
philosophy, and it should rather cast new light on our understanding of the philosophical 
project than demanding transformative changes. But it can accede that some mistakes have 
been made. I shall argue that there have been some mistakes, but I believe that practical 
philosophy is largely done in a manner beyond reproach. In this section I shall list a few 
implications for what tasks there are for practical philosophy, and then I shall try to show one 
important point where some practical philosophy tends to go wrong. 
 
 
                                                 
106 The difficulties with giving a general definition of ’norm’ has been noted by von Wright among others. See 
von Wright, op. cit., p. 1. 
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3.2.1 The Tasks of Practical Philosophy 
Since we have seen that norms may be phrased ambiguously, one task for philosophy will be 
to explain in what sense they might be true. Most practical philosophy is moral philosophy, 
and it is there important to show what norms are moral norms. Not all the norms we have can 
necessarily be derived from moral criteria, and it is important to distinguish these norms from 
moral norms. This project requires a thorough examination of the moral criteria and the 
question of what considerations are morally relevant. It demands a moral theory that is able to 
be distinguished from other normative theories. This is of course a project with a long history, 
but it is always important to be aware of the possibility of normative considerations that are 
not moral.  
 
A further task for practical philosophy is also to discover the truth value of candidate norms. 
We must try to derive what it is that we ought, and from what standard this is so. We may also 
think that some of the norms we believe we have are not in fact genuine norms, that is, not all 
the norms we think we have may be derived from any standard. This is a logical possibility, 
but it would be strange if we walked around believing and following a large number of false 
(or unreal) oughts. Moral philosophers seem sometimes to have thought that if a supposed 
norm was not consistent with the moral criteria, then the norm could not be real. Such 
conclusions are not wrong from the moral point of view. If an ought-sentence is not consistent 
with moral considerations, then it cannot be a real moral norm. On the other hand it could be a 
norm of a different nature. With normative pluralism, we might be able to show that most of 
our supposed norms are true norms, and we might avoid drawing a conclusion that involves 
sending all non-moral norms into the oblivion of unreality. This makes us able to retain 
important norms such as the norms of rationality that Kolodny rejects, and it also makes us 
able to interpret the world more charitably. 
 
Furthermore, practical philosophy must be conscious of its nature. Moral philosophy must 
(qua moral philosophy) not compromise the moral considerations on which it is built. This 
means that it should avoid trying to reach any monistic all-things-considered judgements. 
Firstly, this is logically impossible given normative pluralism. Secondly, and perhaps more 
deeply, this has to do with the point about the purity of the normative standards that was 
mentioned in 2.5.6. If in moral reasoning you bring in non-moral reasons, there might be a 




 3.2.2 Heterogeneous Justifications 
In the history of moral philosophy there is a long project of trying to answer the question of 
why be moral. I believe that a particular way of trying to solve this problem is fundamentally 
mistaken. David Gauthier’s theory is perhaps the clearest example of this kind of attempt at 
answering the question. Gauthier’s project is to try to derive morality from rationality by 
showing how moral principles and behaviour can be taken as a part of rational choice107. By 
rational choice, Gauthier has in mind the view that acting rationally is acting in such a way as 
trying to maximize one’s own utility108. Now, one can think whatever one wants about 
whether this attempt at a derivation is successful. Gauthier’s attempt is sophisticated, but 
many have argued convincingly that the derivation fails109. Be that as it may, from the points 
we have discussed in the sections above, I think it should be clear that Gauthier’s theory is 
more fundamentally mistaken because it is involved in an unsound philosophical project.  
 
Gauthier seems to be attempting to justify moral norms through considerations of rational 
choice. The criteria of rational choice, maximizing one’s own expected utility, does not 
intuitively seem to be the criteria that makes up our moral reasoning. Proper reflection on the 
moral standard seems to confirm this intuition. Morality is concerned with the welfare of 
other people, and not exclusively with my own welfare. If this is true, then morality and 
rational choice are constituted by different criteria and thus are different standards. Moral 
norms therefore cannot be justified by way of the standard of rational choice. You cannot 
reach the conclusion that you morally ought to do something from another standard than 
morality because the meaning of ‘morally ought’ implies that it is derived from moral criteria. 
So in that sense, Gauthier’s project, necessarily fails. One type of norms cannot be derived 
from a standard of a different kind. Heterogeneous justifications are not logically possible.  
 
What Gauthier is doing does not, in the end, seem to be moral philosophy, but the philosophy 
of rational choice or egoism. That is not saying anything bad, for Gauthier may have 
discovered some philosophically interesting conclusions that the actions required by rational 
choice or enlightened egoism is more similar to the actions required by morality than one 
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108 Ibid., p. 22. Utility is here measured by the degree to which your preferences are satisfied. 
109 See particularly Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ”Deception and Reasons to be Moral”, in Contractarianism and 




might otherwise have thought. But he does not show that rational behaviour is moral 
behaviour110. A moral agent seems to be someone who acts out of moral considerations, and 
not from his own self-concern. At best he might have shown, although I find it unlikely, that 
morality and rationality require the exact same actions, but we might still say that the moral 
and the rational agents act from different reasons and justify their actions in different ways111. 
There is also the suspicion that if the actions required of rational choice and morality 
coincide, that would only be contingently so, in which case we could not say that a rational 
person necessarily does the thing that is morally required. But even if it did, we could still 
speak of two different types of justifications, so long as the criteria of the standards were not 
identical.  
 
Gauthier wants to deny my conclusion. He considers the view that there are no extramoral 
foundations for moral justification, and that morality needs no additional justification than 
moral considerations. What he says though is that we have a mode of justification that does 
not require the introduction of moral considerations, and this he calls the “neutral, deliberative 
justification”112. This mode of justification is nothing other than subjective expected utility 
maximization. So Gauthier is a normative monist, but of a different kind than Broome and 
Wedgwood who wanted to unify our different considerations into ‘all-things-considered’ 
oughts. For Gauthier, subjective expected utility maximization is all that matters to what we 
ought and to justification. Gauthier says that 
 
If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise, in relation to choice and action, does not perish with it. 
Rather, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not 
only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that deliberative justification is more clearly basic, that it 
cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, 
morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental.113 
 
But in chapter 2, we saw that it is perfectly possible to deny that this kind of deliberative type 
of justification, or indeed any kind of justification, is more basic or fundamental. If the moral 
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Contractarianism and Rational Choice, p. 219. 
111 I find it difficult to see why we, on Gauthier’s theory, ought to heed those persons without any bargaining 
power. Because of this, among other problems, I do not think the actions required by rational choice coincide 
with the actions required by morality. This problem also shows the moral danger of impure moral theories. 




mode of justification conflicts with the rational, that does not mean that we have to give up 
one of them and call it illusory.  
 
We should agree with Peter Vallentyne when he says that Gauthier is not interested in arguing 
about the proper conception of morality, and that if his theory does not capture the traditional 
conception of morality, then Gauthier would say that this is so much the worse for the 
traditional conception114. This means that if Gauthier’s theory would imply something which 
our moral intuitions find abhorrent, then he would still be forced to say that that is what we 
ought to do (and that this is the only thing we ought to do). This is a danger of insisting on 
just one mode of justification. With normative pluralism, we can understand how it can be 
true that we ought not to do it, since we can adopt a moral framework. But if there are several 
modes of justification, then the possibility of moral justifications does not imply that we must 
sacrifice the normativity of the principles of rational choice. 
 
 
3.3 Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason 
In the concluding chapter of Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics, there arises a 
conundrum. After Sidgwick throughout his book has argued for the reasonableness of 
Utilitarianism, even as the “ultimate standard of right conduct”115, he now argues that the 
same thing can be said about Egoism (which he also has called Prudence). He writes: 
 
It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction between any one individual and any 
other is real and fundamental, and that consequently “I” am concerned with the quality of my existence 
as an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of 
the existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not see how it can be proved that this 
distinction is not to be taken as fundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action for an 
individual.116 
 
This passage can be seen as puzzling because it has given rise to what has been called the 
“dualism of practical reason”. The dualism of practical reason results from the fact that two of 
Sidgwick’s methods of ethics – egoism and utilitarianism – are supposed to be equally 
                                                 
114 Peter Vallentyne, ”Gauthier’s Three Projects”, in Contractarianism and Rational Choice, p. 2. 
115 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), p. 497. 
116 Ibid., p. 498. 
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defensible117. It can seem as if Sidgwick concludes that it is true both that you ought to do 
what benevolence or utilitarianism requires, and that you ought to do what prudence or 
egoism requires. Since these standards rely on different criteria in determining what you 
ought, it also seems that they will require different things. This sounds rather similar to 
normative pluralism, and from that perspective, the passage is perhaps not so puzzling after 
all. I do not wish to argue that Sidgwick should correctly be interpreted as a normative 
pluralist (or dualist), but at least I think I can claim that normative pluralism is able to make 
sense of the notion that the two methods are equally defensible. It can do this without 
supposing any contradiction in Sidgwick’s thoughts, and thus avoiding the conclusion of 
“moral chaos” and the failure of the moral project. 
 
There are other interpretations of Sidgwick. One that is especially interesting is an 
interpretation offered by David Brink, since this interpretation raises some complex questions 
about standards and justification. I will go through Brink’s analysis quite thoroughly because 
the questions it raises throws some light upon the implications of normative pluralism and its 
fruitfulness as a theory. My contention shall be that normative pluralism can solve the 
problems that Brink raises better than his own analysis can. 
 
Brink says that the main difficulty in understanding the dualism of practical reason is whether 
to represent it as (a) a conflict between competing moral theories, that is, between 
utilitarianism and ethical egoism, or as (b) a conflict between a utilitarian theory of morality 
and an egoist theory of rationality118. He says further that the interpretive choice between 
these two options depends on how we should understand Sidgwick’s views about the 
relationship between rationality and morality, and in particular upon whether Sidgwick should 
be understood as an internalist or an externalist. He says that (a) derives from an internalist 
reading, while (b) requires an externalist reading. These two positions are defined in the 
following way119: 
 
Internalism: The view that there is an internal or conceptual connection between moral 
considerations and either motivation or reasons for action. It is an internal or 
conceptual truth about morality that moral obligation or recognition of moral 
                                                 
117 David O. Brink, ”Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 66, 
No, 3; September 1988, 291-307), p. 291. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid., p. 292. 
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obligation provides the agent with reason to perform his obligation. The rationality of 
morality cannot depend upon anything external to moral considerations themselves. 
Internalism claims that it is true in virtue of the concept of morality that moral 
considerations necessarily provide agents with reasons for action. 
 
Externalism: The view that there is no internal or conceptual connection between 
morality and rationality. The rationality of moral considerations depends upon factors 
external to the concept of morality, that is, external to the fact that the considerations 
in question are moral considerations. 
 
Before going on we should take note of two things. First, Brink says about internalism that it 
is the view that there is an internal connection between moral considerations and either 
motivation or reasons for action. From the rest of Brink’s discussion it should be clear that he 
is only talking about the relationship between morality and reasons for action. One can be an 
internalist about motivation, but it seems to me that this question can be separated from the 
question about internalism of reasons. Brink does not seem to rely on these issues being 
related, and neither shall I. Indeed it might seem as if the normative pluralist is committed to 
denying motivational internalism. Remember that we rejected Wedgwood’s Normative 
Judgement Internalism (NJI) which claimed that all rational people will intend what they 
judge they ought. The second thing we should note is that when Brink speaks bout 
‘rationality’ and whether some obligation is ‘rational’, he only asks whether we have reasons 
to comply. He does not use rationality to refer to a specific standard with determinate criteria, 
like David Gauthier does when he understands rationality as equivalent with the criteria of 
rational choice theory. Brink is thus not talking about a specific kind of reason, but about 
reasons in general. 
 
Brink admits of being an externalist120, and he also thinks that Sidgwick ought to be 
understood in this way121. What speaks in favour of internalism is the fact that it is a common 
and important belief about the nature of morality and its role in our practical thinking that 
well informed reasonable people could not always be indifferent to moral considerations, and 
internalism promises to establish this connection much more securely than externalism can122. 
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If morality is to be justified through extramoral considerations, then it might turn out that we 
ought not to be moral after all, and the latter conclusion does not seem intuitive. But Brink 
believes that internalism is too costly. He says the following: 
 
There is a certain kind of scepticism about morality – amoralist scepticism – which both common sense 
thinking about morality and a long philosophical tradition asks us to take seriously. Amoralist 
scepticism asks why we should care about morality or moral demands. Sometimes morality seems to 
demand much of us. In reflecting on these moral requirements, it can seem natural to ask ‘Why should I 
be moral?’. The externalist can take the amoral sceptic seriously and try to answer him. The internalist, 
however, must claim that amoral scepticism is really incoherent. According to the internalist, the amoral 
sceptic must be guilty of either a moral or a conceptual mistake.123 
 
The problem with internalism is therefore that it is a too easy solution to a long philosophical 
problem and that it is not able to represent the amoralist challenge. The externalist can not 
only represent the problem, but can even try to answer it by showing that an amoralist is 
irrational not to care about moral considerations124.  
 
Now, since externalism is in Brink’s view, the best option, he wants to interpret Sidgwick 
charitably by construing him as an externalist. In doing this, Brink says it is most natural to 
treat the dualism of practical reason as (b) a conflict between utilitarian morality and egoist 
rationality. Brink says that “it seems pretty clear that Sidgwick views the dualism of practical 
reason, not as a conflict between competing moral theories, but as raising the question of the 
justifiability of morality”125. Although (a) – the view that the dualism of practical reason 
represents a conflict between competing moral theories – does not strictly entail internalism, 
(b) does entail externalism. Option (b) takes the amoralist challenge seriously and that 
requires externalism, according to Brink. Option (a) also seems unattractive because it is 
difficult to accept that we can see egoism as an ethical theory. Brinks writes that: 
 
[…] ethical egoism can appeal to the argument for the near coincidence of self-interest and duty to rebut 
the charge that ethical egoism is a nonstarter. Now there is something in this suggestion. If the demands 
of self-interest and duty can be shown to coincide to a large extent, then this makes ethical egoism less 
counter-intuitive than it would otherwise be. But I do not think that this is enough to render ethical 
egoism very plausible. For our common sense moral beliefs include not only first order moral beliefs 
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about what actions are morally required of us but also second order moral beliefs about why those 
actions are morally required of us.126 
 
Brink supposes that ethical egoism will only seem plausible to an internalist since an 
internalist requires that morality necessarily provides reasons for action127. It might for 
instance be thought, as Gauthier seems to do, that the only kind of reasons we have are the 
egoistic ones. Finally, Brink thinks that Sidgwick’s epistemology demands an externalist 
reading. Brink says that Sidgwick claims that both utilitarianism and egoism are the object of 
fundamental intuitions, that is, they are both self-evident128. One of the conditions of self-
evident propositions is that they must be mutually consistent129. But since utilitarianism and 
ethical egoism seem inconsistent – they are competing, incompatible moral theories – the 
egoism that is referred to must instead be rational egoism.  
 
These three considerations – taking amoralist scepticism seriously, the problem of viewing 
egoism as an ethical theory, and the epistemological concern of inconsistent self-evident 
moral theories – all point to understanding the dualism of practical reason as (b), namely as a 
conflict between moral utilitarianism and rational egoism. And (b) requires externalism, Brink 
says. 
 
Although I can happily accept (b), I shall deny that (b) requires externalism. I shall also deny 
that externalism is our best option, and that it provides the most charitable interpretation of 
Sidgwick. Brink’s analysis is a good one. But he fails to take into account the possibility of 
normative pluralism, and this is where he goes wrong. Brink’s normative monism becomes 
apparent in this passage: 
 
An externalist asks whether she ought to do as morality requires. She might restate her question, 
somewhat paradoxically, by asking whether she ought to do what she ought to do. The externalist can 
remove this air of paradox by distinguishing between two senses of ‘ought’: a moral ought and an ought 
of rationality. She can then admit that it is part of the meaning of the ought of rationality that if we 
ought (in this sense) to do something, then we have reason to do that thing, and still deny that it is part 
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required by traditional moral considerations. 
127 Ibid., p. 296. 
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129 Sidgwick, op. cit., p. 341. 
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of the meaning of a moral ought that if we ought (in this sense) to do something, we thereby have a 
reason to do that thing.130 
 
At first glance, this may seem similar to normative pluralism since Brink distinguishes 
between two senses of ‘ought’; the moral and the rational ought. But in fact, Brink is making 
the exact same move as Broome; he is making the distinction by relegating the ‘moral ought’ 
to the non-normative domain. The ought of rationality becomes the monistic ought (perhaps 
identical to the ought all-things-considered), while morality only gives the appearance of 
being a real ought. We have already been over why this monistic ought will not do, but let us 
now look at what possibilities normative pluralism gives us in the present context. 
 
As to the question of amoralist skepticism, Brink is right in rejecting theories that cannot even 
ask the amoralist question in any serious way. We should require of theories of normativity 
that they permit us to ask “ought I to follow the norms of morality?” and leaving it as an open 
question. On the other hand, Brink admits that internalism has some advantages because it is 
able to establish securely a positive answer to this question. It might seem that if anything is 
normative, morality is. Moral norms might be seen as exemplars of what counts as being real 
norms. Further, the internal connection between morality and reasons that internalism posits 
also seem to have some intuitive appeal. If we are to count moral norms as real norms, then it 
seems that we must have reason to follow them, or else they wouldn’t be genuine norms. In 
any case, normative pluralism is able to accommodate both sides of the apparent dilemma. By 
saying that norms are the ought-conclusions that can be derived from normative standards (in 
this case morality), we imply that there is an internal connection between norms and reasons. 
The norms in question are necessarily justified by the standard they are derived from. But 
even if we take this internalist position that follows from our definition of norms, we still can 
make sense of amoralist skepticism. For we also recognize that there are other standards 
besides morality. There is then a clear sense in which we can ask whether one ought to follow 
the moral norms. Once we take up another standard as the justifying framework, we can come 
to the conclusion that from this standpoint there is no reason to be moral. Sidgwick mentions 
egoism or prudence as a standard that is different from morality. The criteria of this standard 
are sufficiently different from the criteria of morality that it does indeed seem like we often 
have no prudential reasons to be moral. Amoralist skepticism then becomes the position 
where we ask from a non-moral standpoint whether we have reason to be moral. We can even 
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say that the amoralist skeptic is in a sense right. But this does not mean that morality is not 
justified in any way. If we do not reason from moral considerations it should not be surprising 
that we can deny that we ought to be moral, but once we do reason from these considerations 
things will seem rather different. We can thus accommodate amoralist skepticism – even the 
truth of amoralist skepticism – while still accepting that there is an internal connection 
between reasons and morality which ensures that morality is justified. 
 
We can see that (b) then – the understanding of the dualism of practical reason as a conflict 
between a utilitarian theory of morality and an egoist theory of rationality – is consistent with 
internalism and hence does not require externalism. Brink argued that (b) makes us able to ask 
the amoralist question of whether we have reasons (identified by egoism) to be moral, and 
that this required externalism. Egoism is interpreted to be the external standard which either 
does or does not justify morality. Internalism though, can by assuming normative pluralism, 
take there to be several standards, each internally justified, each self-evident in Sidgwick’s 
sense, and thus understand amoralist skepticism as the rejection of moral norms from a 
prudential or other non-moral standard. 
 
So (b) does not require externalism. But now it also seems like internalism, along with 
normative pluralism, is able to give a much more charitable interpretation of Sidgwick. Brink 
says that only the externalist reading allows us to avoid attributing to Sidgwick a fairly 
significant inconsistency or confusion131. Although Brink may be right in this claim if we 
assume normative monism, we have seen that this does not seem to be the case if we assume 
normative pluralism. And while Brink’s externalist reading is able to avoid some conceptual 
inconsistencies, the reading nonetheless brings Sidgwick into other difficulties. Brink himself 
admits that the externalist reading does not vindicate in a good way the common belief that 
agents typically do have reasons to be moral132. He mentions that it can seem like morality 
sometimes demands too much of us133. If what provides reasons for action is egoism, then it 
seems as if we often have reason not to be moral. Moreover, if our conceptions of morality 
also include second-order beliefs about why to follow moral norms, then it seems we cannot 
ever prudentially be moral. For if we act out of egoistic considerations, then even if the action 
is the same as that required by morality, we still have not acted morally. This means that if we 
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take the externalist reading of Sidgwick such that egoism determines the justifiability of 
morality, then morality will turn out not to be justified after all. This claim which is contrary 
to the common belief Brink refers to, can be avoided through an internalist reading that 
assumes normative pluralism. We can then avoid the need to appeal to any external “super-
standard” to justify morality. We can hold it to be true both that we ought to be moral and that 
we ought to be prudential; each conclusion justified in different ways through different 
criteria. We can thus avoid concluding that Sidgwick failed in his justification of morality. 
Both utilitarianism and egoism can be seen as self-evident and as mutually consistent, and 
since both can be true we can give a real sense to the dualism of practical reason. 
 
Besides all the things mentioned, we see that normative pluralism is an internalist theory, and 
that Brinks externalist reading assumes normative monism. If what I have said in chapter 2 is 
sound, then we have good reasons to reject any theory which assumes normative monism. He 
would thus inherit all the problems related to this position. Brink concludes with the hope that 
a different, more objective, conception of happiness which recognizes important social or 
other-regarding components in an agents good can better vindicate the rationality of 
Sidgwick’s utilitarian moral demands134. We should be wary of such a project. Would it really 
be a good conception of what happiness is? Can it accommodate all the things we take to 
determine the action’s rightness? Could it find any non-idiosyncratic way of weighing self-
regarding and other-regarding concerns? Would it be able to maintain traditional egoist 
concerns as genuine considerations to be taken into account? Can it accommodate a 
demanding morality? It seems that something has to give. Normative pluralism on the other 




In this chapter I have tried to spell out some of normative pluralism’s implications for 
justification. The norms we have are justified by the criteria of our various standards, not 
through an appeal to some super-standard like the monistic ‘ought all things considered’. The 
content of norms, that is, the actions required of us, can be justified by many different 
standards. Each standard yields a different type of justification than the other standards do. 
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Normative propositions that have not specified its mode of justification are ambiguous, and it 
is one of the tasks of philosophy to show in what manner it can be justified.  
 
Since there is no super-standard practical philosophy should be careful with trying to derive 
or justify one type of norms from a standard different in kind. These kinds of heterogeneous 
types of justification will not be valid, and cannot capture the way our norms are justified. I 
have mentioned Gauthier’s attempt to derive morality from rational choice as one example of 
these kinds of invalid justifications. 
 
Lastly, I examined Brink’s attempt to apply an externalist theory of reasons to Sidgwick’s 
dualism of practical reason. We found that internalism, along with normative pluralism, was 
able to offer a much better alternative. Not only could it give a more charitable interpretation 
of Sidgwick, but it could account for the normativity and justifiability of morality in a better 
way. Furthermore, it could make sense of amoralist skepticism – something we agreed to be 
required of a normative theory – and even give a charitable interpretation of the skeptic by 
supposing that he might even be right in some senses, while still avoiding the conclusion that 
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